University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

4-6-2016

Increasing Auditor Sensitivity to the Risk of
Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Assessing
Incentives and Pressures on Top Management
Donald Wengler
University of South Florida, wengler@ucmo.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Accounting Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Wengler, Donald, "Increasing Auditor Sensitivity to the Risk of Fraudulent Financial Reporting: Assessing Incentives and Pressures on
Top Management" (2016). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6428

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Increasing Auditor Sensitivity to the Risk of Fraudulent Financial Reporting:
Assessing Incentives and Pressures on Top Management

by

Donald C. Wengler

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Lynn Pippenger School of Accountancy
Muma College of Business
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Patrick R. Wheeler, Ph.D.
Lisa Milici Gaynor, Ph.D.
Uday S. Murthy, Ph.D.
Terry Sincich, Ph.D.
Date of Approval:
March 4, 2016

Keywords: Experimental, fraud risk factor, fraudulent financial reporting, fraud triangle, incentive
compensation, prospect theory

Copyright © 2016, Donald C. Wengler

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I first thank each of my University of South Florida (USF) dissertation committee
members for their guidance, review and support, beginning with the proposal development stage
and throughout the dissertation process. I appreciate the time, talents and patience of Professor
Patrick R. Wheeler, in his roles as dissertation Chair and as Ph.D. coordinator. I am also thankful
to Professor Lisa Milici Gaynor for encouraging me to design an experimental instrument that
participants would actually complete, and for leading me to expand my view of the research
question to include the impacts of auditor consideration of executive compensation. Professor
Terry Sincich has played a valuable role in supporting my quest for clear thinking, and has
contributed much to my development as a scholar through his teachings in applied statistics.
Importantly, this study would have never been completed without the tireless introductions,
support and lobbying of Professor Uday S. Murthy, which enabled me to recruit public
accounting firm auditor participants through the Advisory Council to the Lynn Pippenger School
of Accountancy at USF. Likewise, I also express my sincere appreciation to Professor Jo Lynne
Koehn and the School of Accountancy and Computer Information Systems faculty at the
University of Central Missouri (UCM) for their introduction of me to their Advisory Board,
which lead to additional public accounting firm auditor participants from the central U.S.
A special thank you is expressed to the individual study participants for their time, and to
their employing public accounting firms, who supported the efforts of this study by providing
access to these valuable human resources. Also, thank you to the USF Muma College of

Business for providing Dr. L. Rene “Bud” Gaiennie Endowment funding of costs necessary to
travel to and recruit auditor participants.
Thank you to my colleagues and workshop participants from the University of South
Florida, from the 2014 Florida Accounting Behavioral Research Symposium at Florida Atlantic
University, and from the University of Central Missouri, for feedback on various stages of this
project. Also, I thank Professor William Kinney at the University of Texas, for his guidance on
articulating the research question, during his leadership at the AAA/Deloitte Foundation/J.
Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium in 2014. A special thank you is owed to Rina Limor Hirsch,
who as a Ph.D. student one year ahead of my Ph.D. class, was a constant source of information
and support throughout my Ph.D. experience.
Lastly, I appreciate the information, advice, and brief communications provided by a
variety of people who, without knowing me, did not hesitate to help. This includes Professors
Vicky Hoffman, Mark Zimbelman, and Michael Favere-Marchesi, who provided copies of their
own experimental instruments and related advice. Also appreciated are the recollections of
Professors Mark Beasley, Zoe-Vonna Palmrose and Mr. David Landsittel regarding their service
on the AICPA SAS No. 99 Fraud Task Force and the recollections of Professor W. Steve
Albrecht, regarding his service on the AICPA SAS No. 82 Fraud Task Force. It is an honor to be
joining a profession where strangers with common subject matter interests will take time to help
one another.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... iii
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... iv
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................................v
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................1
2. LITERATURE REVIEW—FRAUD TRIANGLE AND RISK FACTORS IN
AUDITING ..............................................................................................................9
2.1 The Evolution of the Fraud Triangle and Fraud Auditing Standards ............................9
2.2 The “Expectation Gap” Drives Fraud Auditing Standards .........................................14
2.3 The Incentive/Pressure Fraud Triangle Category ........................................................15
2.4 Criticism of the Fraud Triangle Model ........................................................................16
2.5 Fraud Risk Factors in Auditing Standards ...................................................................18
3. LITERATURE REVIEW—EXECUTIVE CONPENSATION AND FRAUD ........................20
3.1 Consideration of Executive Compensation in Fraud Auditing Standards ...................20
3.2 Research on Executive Compensation and Auditing ...................................................22
3.3 Research on Executive Compensation and Financial Statement Fraud .......................23
4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT.............................................................................................28
4.1 Fraud Risk Factor Usefulness ......................................................................................28
4.2 Fraud Risk Factor Focus: Individual or Organizational ..............................................30
4.3 Fraud Risk Factor Motivation Type: Incentive or Pressure .........................................33
4.4 Interaction of Fraud Risk Factor Focus and Motivation Type .....................................35
4.5 Incentive and Pressure in Executive Compensation ....................................................36
5. RESEARCH METHOD.............................................................................................................38
5.1 Participants ...................................................................................................................38
5.2 Experimental Instrument Format and Delivery ...........................................................40
5.3 Manipulation of Fraud Risk Factors for Fraud Motivation .........................................43
5.4 Manipulation of Compensation Alignment .................................................................48
5.5 Auditor Judgment Dependent Variable and Covariates...............................................51
5.6 Auditor Decision Dependent Variables .......................................................................52
5.7 Experimental Procedures .............................................................................................55
5.8 Planned Contrasts Analysis..........................................................................................56

i

6. RESULTS ................................................................................................................................60
6.1 Manipulation Checks ...................................................................................................60
6.2 Significance Criteria and Data Assumptions ...............................................................61
6.3 Tests of Audit Judgment Hypotheses ..........................................................................61
6.4 Tests of Audit Decision Hypotheses ............................................................................66
6.5 Tests of Audit Decisions Under Two Alternate Compensation Schemes ...................72
6.6 Practical Significance of Results .................................................................................74
7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................76
7.1 Assessing Fraud Motivation Type ...............................................................................77
7.2 Assessing Fraud Risk Factor Focus .............................................................................77
7.3 Limitations and Future Research .................................................................................79
7.4 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................80
REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................82
APPENDIX A: Fraud Risk Factors for Fraudulent Financial Reporting ......................................88
APPENDIX B: Summary of Auditor Fraud Risk Assessment Literature .....................................93
APPENDIX C: Experimental Instrument ......................................................................................96
APPENDIX D: IRB Approval Letter ..........................................................................................107

ii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Number of Public Accounting Firm Participants by Position and Firm Size ..................39
Table 2: Dependent Variable Measures for Big 4 versus Non-Big 4 Firm Participants................40
Table 3: Dependent Variable Measures for Paper versus Electronic Instrument Users ................41
Table 4: Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments .........................................................................63
Table 5: Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments—High vs. Low Compensation
Alignment ....................................................................................................................64
Table 6: Mean, (Standard Deviation), and Group Comparison Audit Decisions ..........................71

iii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Fraud Triangle Categories in Current Auditing Standards ...............................................9
Figure 2: Evolution of the Fraud Triangle Model ..........................................................................11
Figure 3: Summary of Compensation and Fraudulent Financial Reporting Literature .................25
Figure 4: Direct and Indirect Mental Model Examples .................................................................32
Figure 5A: Manipulation Comparison Between Groups, Panel A ................................................44
Figure 5B: Manipulation Comparison Between Groups, Panel B .................................................45
Figure 5C: Manipulation Comparison Between Groups, Panel C .................................................46
Figure 5D: Manipulation Comparison Between Groups, Panel D ................................................47
Figure 6: Treatment for Low Compensation Alignment with Payoffs to the Organization ..........49
Figure 7: Treatment for High Compensation Alignment with Payoffs to the Organization .........49
Figure 8: Predicted Group Relationships from Hypothesis 1a ......................................................57
Figure 9: Predicted Group Relationships from Hypothesis 2a ......................................................58
Figure 10: Motivation-for-Fraud Fisk Assessments under Low Compensation Alignment .........62
Figure 11: Motivation-for-Fraud Fisk Assessments under All Six Conditions .............................66

iv

ABSTRACT
The ability of auditors to detect fraud, including intentional material misstatements in earnings,
remains key to the credibility of audit firms and confidence in capital markets. The PCAOB
concludes from its most recent inspections of public company audits that auditors often fail to
assess and respond to risks of material misreporting by management. In a behavioral experiment,
this study concludes that auditors can increase sensitivity to management motivation to misreport
by actively seeking to transform identified risk factors focused on the organization, into factors
focused on top managers, and to evaluate whether these manager-focused risk factors represent
incentives for personal gain or pressures to avoid a personal loss on the managers. Currently,
auditing standards use incentive and pressure as interchangeable constructs, but auditors in this
study assess pressure on managers to avoid a loss as a greater risk than an incentive to managers
to attain a gain. Results also demonstrate that auditors will be made more sensitive to fraudulent
financial reporting risk when focusing on pressure on top managers, than they will be by
engaging in a traditional process of assessing total fraud risk based on the three fraud triangle
elements. This study is the first to propose a theoretical explanation for why prior studies reflect
auditor insensitivity to organizational level fraud risk factors. This study is also the first to
enhance knowledge about auditor risk assessment and decision-making through the application
of prospect theory and through disaggregation of one of the three elements of the fraud triangle
model, by differentiating between incentive and pressure for misreporting earnings.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The ability of auditors to detect intentional material misstatements in earnings remains
key to the credibility of audit firms and confidence in capital markets. Auditing standards require
financial statement auditors to consider risk factors for fraudulent financial reporting, and
standards have been periodically updated to meet perceived deficiencies in auditor fraud risk
assessment process.1 Most recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) issued its auditing standard AS No. 18 (PCAOB 2014) which requires public company
auditors to obtain an understanding of senior management compensation arrangements that could
lead to “incentives or pressures” to meet financial targets. AS No. 18 (PCAOB 2014) considers
incentives and pressures on management within both fraudulent financial reporting and earnings
management contexts. A company’s executive management is in a unique position to commit
financial reporting fraud (PCAOB 2014) by overriding controls and acting in collusion with
other employees (Center for Audit Quality 2010). The Securities and Exchange Commission
identified the CEO or CFO as having some level of involvement in 89 percent of fraud cases
between 1998 through 2007, up from 83 percent between 1987 through 1997 (COSO 2010).
Some fraud risk factor examples in fraud auditing standards (SAS No. 99, AICPA 2002) focus
directly on incentives and pressures on top managers, while others focus on organizational

1

An extensive list of example fraud risk factors was first introduced into auditing standards with Statements on
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 82 (AICPA 1997). The organization of SAS No. 82 fraud risk factors was modified
with the superseding standard, SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002). The SAS No.99 examples of fraud risk factors were
subsequently recodified into AU 316 for public company audits, AU-C 240 for private company audits and ISA 240
for in international auditing standards. Since SAS No. 99 is nearly identical to all of the recodifications of this fraud
auditing standard, “SAS No. 99” will be used in this paper as an abbreviated reference to all of these auditing
standards recodifications currently in use.
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factors. However, reporting decisions are made by individual managers and groups of managers,
not by the organization. Motivation to act can be held by managers, but not the by the
organization itself. So a mental process is required before organizationally focused risk factors
can be assessed for motivation impacts on top managers. Assimilating an understanding of
executive compensation into organizationally-oriented fraud risk factor assessments requires
additional cognitive effort by auditors. This research seeks to enhance auditor fraud risk
assessment process for fraudulent financial reporting through extension of prior academic
research and theory.
Some fraud risk assessment activities by auditors in the field are low quality efforts
(Brazel et al. 2010). One of the most significant recurring areas of audit deficiencies identified
by the PCAOB from its 2013 and 2014 inspections of audits is that auditors fail to assess and
respond to risks of material misstatement (PCAOB 2015). Post implementation of the Sarbanes
Oxley anti-fraud legislation, the average number of public company restatements for fraud has
declined from a high of 59 in 2002, but still remained an average of 40 or more annually from
2003 to 2006 (Scholz 2014) 2. The number of public company material restatements, as
summarized by Scholz (2014), has also declined from the post-Sarbanes Oxley financial
reporting clean up period, but still remained at a level of hundreds annually through 2012. It is
impossible to know how many of these misstatements are intentional, but from 2003 through
2012, 75.9 percent of material restatements were corrections of overstated earnings, while only
24.1percent were corrections of understated earnings. If these restatements were the result of
unbiased random errors in reporting, one would expect the split between earnings decreasing

2

Scholz (2014) reflects a decline in the number of fraud restatements during the years 2007 to 2012, but makes a
statement that these years are likely incomplete due to the time lag necessary to identify fraudulent financial
reporting through the source documents—the SECs Accounting and Audit Enforcement Releases (AAERs).
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restatements and earnings increasing restatements to be in an approximately equal proportion.
Intentionally misstated financial statements remain a significant concern for auditors, regulators
and capital markets, and more research is needed to better understand causes of management
fraud and ways to prevent and detect it (Center for Audit Quality 2010; COSO 2010). When it
comes to detection of intentional misreporting, effective risk assessment and response by
auditors is a high priority that needs to be addressed in audits (PCAOB 2015).
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) loss aversion can be used to predict that
managers would feel a greater motivation to avoid a loss of wealth from some reference point
than to realize and equal value gain in wealth from that same reference point. Many fraud risk
factors in auditing standards communicate a direct or indirect motivation regarding such a gain
or loss of top manager wealth. This study seeks to evaluate whether auditors perceive different
levels of motivation for fraud, depending on whether fraud risk factors are framed as an incentive
for gain or pressure to avoid a loss for top managers. This leads to the first research question:
Fraud Risk Factor Framing
Will auditors assess different levels of fraudulent financial reporting risk, and conduct different
levels of risk-responsive audit procedures, when assessing motivation-for-fraud factors
representing incentives to realize a gain versus pressure to avoid a loss?
In this study, the use of the word “incentive” means “incentive to realize a gain” from some
reference point, and use of the word “pressure” means “pressure to avoid a loss” from the same
reference point.
Most fraud risk factor examples for financial statement fraud motivation listed in auditing
standards consist of risks focused on the organization.3 Yet, studies indicate that auditors often
rate organizationally focused risk factors as being relatively less important to fraud risk
3

Eleven of 15 fraud risk factor examples in AU 316 (13 of 17 fraud risk factor examples in AU–C 240) relate to the
organization and its industry generally. Only a few are fraud risk factors that relate to manager incentive/pressures.
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assessment (Albrecht and Romney 1986; Apostolou et al. 2001; Wilks and Zimbelman 2004). A
relatively unimportant organizationally focused risk factor from these studies could be
considered relatively important to fraud risk assessment if it could be converted to a risk factor
focused directly on top managers. This study seeks to compare differences between auditor risk
assessment and auditor response to similar fraud risk factors focused on either the organization
or on top managers in order to answer the following research question:
Fraud Risk Factor Focus
Will auditors assess different levels of fraudulent financial reporting risk, and conduct different
levels of risk-responsive audit procedures, when assessing motivation-for-fraud factors focused
on the organization versus on top managers, and will the fraud risk factor focus affect perceived
differences between incentives and pressures?
Any failure to incorporate an understanding of compensation structure into risk
assessment could prevent auditors from recognizing differences between compensation related
incentives or pressures on top managers. This failure to incorporate an understanding of
compensation structure into risk assessment is important when risk factors observed are focused
on the organization, and compensation payoffs to top managers are aligned with financial
performance payoffs to the organization. In that setting, organizational financial performance
should directly result in payoffs (wealth gains or wealth losses) to top managers who hold large
portfolios of company stock and options. This discussion leads to the following research
question:
Executive Compensation Alignment with Organizational Payoffs
Does the level of alignment between compensation payoffs to top management and financial
performance payoffs to the organization and its shareholders/owners affect auditor assessments
of incentive and pressures when fraud risk factors are focused on the organization?
The objective of this study is to determine whether the level of risk assessments and audit
work planned will vary based on whether audit risk factors are focused on the organization or on

4

top managers, and whether audit risk factors are framed as incentives or pressures, including
compensation-related incentives or pressures. If framing and focus impact the level of risk
assessed, then how can this insight be used to inform the fraud risk assessment process to
maximize sensitivity to fraud risks? And since some incentives and pressures relate to
compensation, what is the role of understanding executive compensation in these risk
assessments? Accordingly, the implication for this research is as follows:
Research Implication Question
Given answers to the research questions above, how can auditors conduct fraud risk assessment
procedures in a way to maximize their sensitivity to fraudulent financial reporting risk?
It is important to know whether auditors make systematically different risk assessments
for different types of fraud risk factors so that fraud risk assessment can be conducted in a way to
maximize sensitivity4 to fraud risks. The level of risk assessed by the auditor should influence
audit planning decisions made. “The auditor should design and perform further audit procedures
whose nature, timing, and extent are responsive to the assessed risks of material misstatement
due to fraud at the assertion level” (AICPA 2006, AU 318.07). Sensitivity to fraud risks should
lead auditors to plan relatively less evidential work when risk factors are assessed as low and
relatively more evidential work when risk factors are assessed as high.
The experiment in this study is specifically addressing motivation-for-fraud risk factors,
which are labeled “incentives/pressures” in fraud auditing standards (SAS No. 99, AICPA 2002).
The experiment sets SAS No. 99 attitude/rationalization fraud risk factors for financial statement
fraud constant at low risk levels, sets SAS No. 99 opportunity fraud risk factors for financial
statement fraud constant at high levels, and then manipulates two experimental factors for fraud
motivation in a 2 X 2 factorial design: 1) motivation focus (organizational focus or individual top
4

Sensitivity is the ability to distinguish between high and low level risk (Wilks and Zimbelman 2004; FaverMarchesi 2013; Zimbelman 1997).
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manager focus) and 2) motivation frame (incentive for a gain or pressure to avoid a loss). In the
experiment audit professionals assume the role of an audit manager reviewing audit work papers
in a client audit case. Their initial work paper review consists of a risk assessment of fraud risk
factors during audit planning prior to year-end. Participants consider fraud risk factors present in
the case and assess risk levels for those factors. Four participant groups assess very similar
factors for fraud motivation, which are framed in one of four ways in a between subjects
experimental design. Also, two different management compensation structures are varied
between groups receiving organizationally focused fraud risk factors. Additional case facts are
then presented, including certain year-end account balances, and management explanation for
those balances. This case information provides evidence of potential overstatement of revenues
and accounts receivable by the client. Participants are then asked to consider case facts and their
assessments of fraud risk, and to plan audit program steps to be responsive to case facts and their
risk assessments.
I find that auditors rate motivation-for-fraud risk as greatest when fraud risk factors are
framed as pressure to avoid a loss focused on top managers. Auditors also make more risk
responsive audit planning decisions for certain audit procedures when fraud risk factors are
framed as a pressure to avoid a loss, rather than as incentive for a gain, or under managerially
focused risk factors.
These findings suggest that financial statement auditors can increase sensitivity to
motivation-for-fraud risks by actively seeking to transform identified risk factors focused on the
organization into risk factors that directly consider the impacts on top managers, and to evaluate
whether these manager-focused risk factors represent incentives for personal gain, pressures to
avoid a personal loss, or have no impact on top managers. Since managers make reporting
6

decisions, not the organization itself, the motivation impact of organizationally focused risk
factors are of greatest risk assessment value when they are transformed so that auditors can
understand their motivation impacts on top managers.
These findings contribute to both the academic literature and to practice. This study
proposes a theoretical explanation and provides some evidence about why auditors in prior
studies (Albrecht and Romney 1986; Apostolou 2001; Wilks and Zimbelman 2004) consider
certain fraud risk factors focused on the organization or industry as relatively lower in relevance,
and factors focused on management as relatively higher in relevance. Regarding risk assessment
audit practice, Trompeter et al. (2013) observe that incentive and pressure are used
interchangeably in auditing standards, but that the two could be different constructs and
researchers should attempt to determine whether differences are important to fraud auditing.
Regarding incentive and pressure outside of auditing contexts, the Center for Audit Quality
(2010, p4) states: “Interestingly, academic research indicates that the desire to recoup or avoid
losses is much more likely to motivate an individual to engage in activities that could lead to
fraud than the desire for personal gain.”5 This current study responds to Trompeter et al. (2013)
and to the Center for Audit Quality (2010) by providing evidence regarding these observations
about incentive and pressure in a setting where auditors are considering management motivation
to misreport. Results support that in auditing practice, attempting to identify risks representing
pressure on top managers is a tangible way to increase sensitivity to fraud risks.

5

The referenced source of this academic research is a Rick and Loewenstein (2008) commentary and critique in the
Journal of Marketing Research on a paper about honesty by Mazar et al. (2008) in the same journal. Rick and
Loewenstein (2008) invoke prospect theory and the fraud triangle model in their commentary. Auditing was not the
subject of these two articles.
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The remainder of this dissertation is organized into six sections. The next section explains
the evolution of fraud auditing standards and the incorporation of the fraud triangle model into
auditing standards. Section 3 is a literature review of executive compensation and fraudulent
financial reporting research. Section 4 develops hypotheses. Section 5 describes the research
method. Section 6 describes results. The final section summarizes findings and discusses their
implications.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW—FRAUD TRIANGLE AND RISK FACTORS IN AUDITING
2.1 The Evolution of the Fraud Triangle and Fraud Auditing Standards
The primary fraud auditing standards in place today come from Statements on Auditing
Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, commonly referred to
as SAS 99 (AICPA 2002). The original SAS No. 99 standard is currently codified in AU 316 for
U.S. public company audits, AU-C240 for U.S. private company audits and ISA 240 for
companies audited under international auditing standards. These standards outline an auditor’s
responsibilities for evaluating fraud risk when planning and executing a financial statement
audit. Fraud risk factor examples in current auditing standards are organized and illustrated under
the three categories of a fraud triangle model. A list of fraud risk factor examples in auditing
standards is identical between AU 316, AU-C 240 and ISA 240. The three fraud triangle
categorizations of fraud risk factors for fraudulent financial reporting from AU 316 are found in
Appendix A of this dissertation. The three categories used in these standards are:
1) Incentives/Pressures, 2) Opportunities, and 3) Attitudes/Rationalizations.
The Fraud Triangle
Incentive/Pressure

Rationalization/Attititude

Opportunity

Figure 1: Fraud Triangle Categories in Current Auditing Standards
9

The fraud triangle is a decision aid designed to support an assessment of fraud risk, given
the existence of observed indicators for fraud that fall under each of the three fraud triangle
categories. Figure 2 below summarizes key developments in the birth of the fraud triangle
concept and its evolution into a model influencing fraud risk assessment in current day auditing
standards. The Fraud Triangle model is most commonly attributed to the work of criminologist
Donald Cressey (1953), who conducted extensive multiple interviews of incarcerated individuals
convicted of embezzlement crimes. Dr. Cressey modified his hypothesis throughout his period of
interviews until it accurately described the situations of all of the embezzlers he interviewed
(Cressey 1953). He concludes that the embezzlers each describe having: 1) a non-sharable
financial problem, 2) an ability to secretly violate someone’s trust, and 3) verbalizations
reconciling a breach of trust with their own positive self-view. Dr. Cressey also observes that
these same embezzlers did not commit such crimes during earlier periods in their lives when one
of the three hypothesized elements was not present. The hypothesis supported by Cressey (1953)
results in a descriptive model of all cases he observed, which were from known fraud
convictions. Fraud models that follow, including the model that is currently known as the fraud
triangle, are used as predictive models.
Dr. Cressey did not use the term “fraud triangle” in his work. Joseph Wells, who founded
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (“ACFE”), met Dr. Cressey, and in 1985, asked
him to appear in a fraud training video being produced by Wells, entitled “Embezzlement: The
Thieves Within” (ACFE 1985).6 Dr. Cressey appears in the video, which for a time displays a
triangle graphic. Dr. Cressey describes each of the three elements leading to embezzlement, and

6

Information about this video is supported by a May 21, 2015 email response to me from a representative of the
ACFE.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the Fraud Triangle Model

11
Opportunities
Integrity of
(Vulnerabilities-- management
effect of internal
controls)
Opportunities

Comment letter by Big Incentives and
8 firm to the Exposure Pressures
Draft for SAS 82
(Arthur Andersen
1996)

Statement on Auditing Incentives/
Standards No. 99
Pressures
(AICPA 2002)

Attitudes/
Rationalizations

Scope expands from embezzlement,
specifically, to business fraud, generally. Focus
shifts from unobservable conditions of
individuals to observable conditions of
individuals and organizations. This also includes
an increased focus on observable integrity
characteristics of individual employees or
managers.

Asset
Observes that pressure and opportunities are
misappropriation by based on perceptions, which could vary
individuals
between different individuals' perceptions of the
same situation. Also observes that some
pressures are not always financial. This article
contains the first documented use of the term
"Fraud Triangle."

Both asset
misappropriation by
individuals and
fraudulent financial
reporting in
organizations

Probabilistic perspective: These three conditions
are generally (emphasis added) present when
fraud exists (AU 316.33)

Both asset
misappropriation by
individuals and
fraudulent financial
reporting in
organizations

"Incentives/Pressures" treated as a single fraud
triangle category. "Attitudes" added to
"Rationalizations." "Attitudes/Rationalizations"
treated as a single fraud triangle category.

Probabilistic perspective: The three conditions
Fraudulent financial Proposes adding "Incentive" to "Pressure," as
together are described as forming the environment reporting in
one of the three elements for fraud.
in which fraud may occur.
organizations

Prerequisite perspective: Article refers to other
unspecified research, and states that all three
conditions must occur together before there is
fraud.

Perceived
opportunity

Article regarding fraud Perceived
in government entities pressure
(Albrecht 1991)

Rationalization

Changes From Prior Model(s)

Prerequisite perspective: All three conditions must Asset
First documented depiction of a triangle graphic
be present before embezzlement occurs.
misappropriation by in connection with a fraud model, although the
individuals
triangle was not called the "fraud triangle."

Opportunities to Personal integrity Probabilistic perspective: A relational probability
commit fraud
risk weighting between the three conditions for
fraud is described, such that a high risk in one or
two conditions can outweigh a low risk in other
fraud conditions(s). Taken together, the three
factor categories form an indication of fraud risk.
This model is called the fraud scale.

Unsharable
Access to funds Rationalization
financial problem

Big 8 firm affiliate
Situational
(Peat, Marwick,
pressures
Mitchell & Co.
Foundation) sponsored
fraud research
(Albrecht et al. 1982)

Fraud education video
(ACFE 1985)

Source
Criminologist study of
embezzlers in prison
(Cressey 1953)

Individual or
Organizational
Condition A
Condition B
Condition C
Fraud as a Function of A, B & C
Context of Fraud
Non-sharable
Ability to violate Verbalizations
Prerequisite perspective: All three conditions must Asset
financial problem trust secretly
reconciling the be present before embezzlement occurs.
misappropriation by
act with positive
individuals
self-view

the following three phrases appear at the bottom of the screen view: 1) Unsharable financial
problem, 2) Access to funds, and 3) Rationalization. However, the first documented use of the
term “fraud triangle” appeared later in an article about fraud in government entities (Albrecht
1991) in which the fraud triangle elements are described as: 1) perceived pressures, 2) perceived
opportunities, and 3) rationalization. The use of the word “perceived” in fraud triangle labels
emphasize that perceptions of the same situations can vary between people, and that it is an
individual’s perception of fraud elements that determine potentially fraudulent behavior.
The perspective taken by fraud models shifted from the initial prerequisite perspective
(all three elements of the fraud triangle must be present before fraud is perpetrated) to a
probabilistic perspective, supported by results of a study of corporate fraud sponsored by an
affiliate of a Big 8 firm, the Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Foundation (the “Albrecht Study”).
Initial models of fraud by Cressey (1953) and Cressey and Wells (ACFE 1985) originally stated
that all three elements of fraud must be present in order for fraud to occur. The Albrecht Study
(Albrecht et al. 1980; Albrecht et al. 1982) resulted in a probabilistic “fraud scale” model, where
evidence of each of the three fraud elements was weighted to determine a likelihood of the
existence of fraud in a given setting. The researchers in the Albrecht Study drew on more than 50
government agencies and private sources of information leading to a review of 52 different
company fraud events. The authors of the Albrecht Study describe its objectives as:
1) To conduct an extensive review of all fraud-related literature;
2) To identify individual, organizational, and societal factors that suggest
a high probability of fraud;
3) To validate these factors by comparing them to past cases of fraud; and
4) To organize the factors into early-warning systems that can be used to
detect and deter fraud.
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Other differences also evolved between initial fraud models and later ones. Compared to
the specific Cressey (1953) hypothesis about embezzlement, the Albrecht Study expands the
scope of financial crimes considered to a much broader set, including financial statement fraud.
The output from the Albrecht Study is a list of red flags (indicators) for fraud categorized by: 1)
situational pressure, 2) opportunity, and 3) personal integrity (Albrecht et al. 1982). These red
flags are also sub-grouped between personal and company indicators of fraud.7 The Albrecht
Study first identifies potential red flags for fraud and then searches details from known fraud
cases for confirmation or disconfirmation of the presence of each red flag. Unlike Cressey’s
(1953) three categories which are considered necessary for fraud, the Albrecht Study describes
the three categories in the framework of a fraud scale, such that the three categories interact or
are weighted against one another so that high risk in one or two categories could outweigh lower
risk in another category (Albrecht et al. 1980; Albrecht et al. 1982; and Albrecht 2014).
In summary, the original fraud model of Cressey (1953) undergoes a shift in perspective
in a number of ways after the Albrecht Study (Albrecht et al. 1980; Albrecht et al. 1982), as
reflected in Exhibit 2, and that shift in perspective survives to the current day fraud triangle
model used to categorize fraud risk factors in current auditing standards. The original model
(Cressey 1953) was descriptive of a sample of known fraud events, while today’s fraud triangle
model is used predictively, in settings where the presence of fraud is unknown. In the original
model (Cressey 1953) the three elements of fraud existing together concurrently were considered
prerequisites for the conduct of a fraudulent act, while today’s model is probabilistic and
presence of any of the elements of fraud are said to be indicators that fraud may exist. In the

7

The subgroups for personal and company indicators of fraud are similar to the subgroups used for fraud risk factors
in current auditing standards, which are currently labeled as risk factors arising from misappropriation of assets and
risk factors arising from fraudulent financial reporting.

13

original fraud model (Cressey 1953) embezzlement was the crime studied, while the current
fraud triangle model is applied to a wide variety of financial crimes (Albrecht et al. 2012, p. 34),
including asset misappropriation, corruption and fraudulent financial reporting. In the original
fraud model (Cressey 1953) the three elements of fraud are unobservable, while in the current
fraud triangle model fraud risk factors are observable indicators of fraud risk.
2.2 The “Expectation Gap” Drives Fraud Auditing Standards
During the 1990s, the expectation gap between auditors and financial statement users
regarding auditors’ responsibility to detect fraud continued to challenge the auditing profession
(AICPA 1993). An exposure draft for a new proposed statement on auditing standards,
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA 1996) was issued. The objective
of this proposed auditing standard was to propose more detailed guidance to auditors on their
responsibilities for detecting fraud in financial statements. The exposure draft for this standard,
which eventually became SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997), presents fraud risk factors from both
academic and practical research (AICPA 1996). The SAS No. 82 fraud risk factor examples are
the same ones still present in auditing standards today (SAS No. 99, AICPA 2002 in AU 316,
AU-C 240, and ISA 240). Many of the Albrecht Study red flags for fraud were incorporated into
these auditing standards. Dr. Albrecht influenced the fraud risk factor content of the SAS No. 82
exposure draft and final standard through his service on the SAS No. 82 Fraud Task Force which
made recommendations to the AICPA Auditing Standards Board for this exposure draft.
However, fraud risk factors in SAS No. 82 were grouped under the following three categories: 1)
management’s characteristics and influence over the control environment, 2) industry conditions,
and 3) operating characteristics and financial stability, rather than under the three fraud triangle
model categories. As a member of the fraud task force, Dr. Albrecht advocated for use of the
14

fraud triangle model categories to organize the fraud risk factor examples listed in SAS No. 82,
but did not prevail because the fraud triangle model was not yet well known, as it is today.8
When SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002), also entitled Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement
Audit, superseded SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997), the fraud triangle model became the framework
for categorizing fraud risk factors in the auditing standard. The example fraud risk factors in SAS
No. 99 (and still codified in current auditing standards for public company, private company, and
international standards) are primarily comprised of the same fraud risk factor examples presented
in SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997).
2.3 The Incentive/Pressure Fraud Triangle Category
The text of the SAS No. 82 exposure draft adds discussion of management incentives for
fraud to that of management pressure for fraud (AICPA 1996, p. 16, 19, 20, 25). In an Arthur
Andersen (1996) comment letter to this exposure draft, this Big 8 firm recommends that fraud
risk factors should be categorized under: 1) incentives and pressures, 2) opportunities (or internal
control vulnerabilities), and 3) integrity of management. This Arthur Andersen recommendation
was not adopted in the final version of SAS 82. However, the “incentives and pressure” category
recommendation is consistent with the “incentive/pressure” description for that fraud triangle
category used to organize fraud risk factor examples in SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002). SAS No. 99
does not differentiate between incentives or pressures in its categorization of fraud risk factors,
and SAS No. 99 fraud task force members do not recall differentiating between incentive and
pressures at the time of their deliberations.9

8

This statement is based on a June 1, 2015 email response to me from Dr. W. Steve Albrecht, reflecting on his
service on the Fraud Task Force for SAS No. 82.
9
Based on email responses to me from the SAS No. 99 Fraud Task Force chair, David Landsittel on May 5, 2015,
and from Fraud Task Force members Dr. Zoe-Vonna Palmrose on April 29, 2015, and Dr. Mark Beasley on April
10, 2015.
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2.4 Criticism of the Fraud Triangle Model
Although SAS No. 99 does not specifically use the term “fraud triangle,” much of the
SAS No. 99 auditing standard was inspired by this fraud triangle conceptualization developed
and promoted by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (“ACFE”) (Morales et al. 2014).
The ACFE is a significant association of fraud-fighting professionals, with 75,000 members, a
professional certification program, frequent continuing education seminars and conferences, an
extensive network of local chapters, and a variety of fraud-fighting publications, including a
practice journal called Fraud Magazine (ACFE 2015). The ACFE uses this extensive network of
resources to promote its vision of the fraud triangle, which it legitimizes through its attributions
to the academic work of criminologist Donald Cressey (Morales et al. 2014). The publication of
SAS No. 99 in 2002 led to a proliferation of fraud triangle awareness, as evidenced by the
number of documents referring to the fraud triangle identified in a review of fraud triangle
literature performed by Morales et al. (2014). They find 223 publications making reference to the
fraud triangle in academic and business literature from 2002 to 2011, up from 19 references from
1979 to 2001. Today the accounting standards setters, the Big 4 firms, the accounting profession,
and the ACFE are actively involved in promoting and diffusing the fraud triangle concept, which
remains accepted without question,10 although Morales et al. (2014) believe that empirical tests
of the practical effectiveness of the fraud triangle model are scarce and unconvincing.
Morales et al. (2014) conclude that the fraud triangle has evolved through a series of
translations and interpretations, and the attributions of the current day fraud triangle to the work
of Donald Cressey are contradicted by important differences between the fraud triangle used in

10

Expanded models, such as the fraud diamond (Wolfe 2004) and the fraud pentagon (Crowe Horwath LLP 2016)
have subsequently been proposed, but these models incorporate the three elements of the fraud triangle and add
other components.

16

auditing standards and the work originally published by Cressey.11 Cressey concluded that the
motivation for embezzlements was a “nonsharable problem,” while the SAS No. 99 category for
fraud motivation is “Incentives/Pressures.” While the “nonsharable problems” identified by
Cressey were private to each embezzler, specific pressures to meet financial targets, incentive
compensation for meeting such targets, and quantification of the targets themselves at companies
are often open to observation, especially in public companies. Cressey’s causal view has been
abandoned in favor of the notion of risk (Morales et al. 2014). This transformation of Cressey’s
(1953) descriptive, prerequisite, unobservable, embezzlement-specific hypothesis into the
predictive, probabilistic, observable, broad perspective of the fraud triangle is necessary for
application of the fraud triangle to an audit environment. There is little evidence to support the
fraud triangle as a general “theory” of financial crime (Donegan and Ganon 2008).
The proceeding critique of the fraud triangle is not intended to discredit its usefulness,
but rather, to support the need to understand the evolution of the fraud triangle and to ask
whether there are opportunities to further develop the fraud triangle for application to auditing
tasks. There is evidence that asking auditors to think more deeply about the fraud triangle when
assessing risk, by disaggregating risk assessments into the three fraud triangle elements,
increases auditor sensitivity to fraud risk (Wilks and Zimbelman 2004; Favere-Marchesi 2013).
This current study evaluates the impact of asking auditors to further disaggregate risk
assessments for motivation for fraud, the incentive/pressure category of the fraud triangle in
current auditing standards.

11

The central criticism by Morales et al. (2014) is the fraud triangle model exclusion of sociological explanations of
fraud such as differential association, a theory about of how fraud is learned from others.
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2.5 Fraud Risk Factors in Auditing Standards
Following the issuance of SAS No. 82 (AICPA 1997) the Accounting Standards Board of
the AICPA committed to study the impact of the standard on auditing practice. Appendix B to
this study summarizes research published beginning 1986 on subjects related to auditor fraud
risk assessment and fraud risk factors. Early studies in Appendix B conclude that many fraud risk
factors proposed were not considered important by auditors (Albrecht and Romney 1986;
Apostolou et al. 2001), and that a checklist of fraud risks can have a dysfunctional effect on
auditor consideration of fraud (Pincus 1989). Zimbelman (1997) finds that auditor attention on
SAS No. 82 fraud risk factors increased attention to fraud uniformly, but the nature of testing by
auditors was not responsively different to low versus high fraud risk cases.
The appendix B studies reflect mixed results regarding auditor response to fraud risks
identified. Auditors often identified increased fraud risk but did not change the nature or extent
of testing in response to the increased fraud risk (Wright and Bedard 2000; Glover et al. 2003;
Asare and Wright 2004). Regarding SAS No.99 fraud risk assessment using the fraud triangle
categories, Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) and Favere-Marchesi (2013) find that disaggregating
fraud risk assessments into the three fraud triangle categorizations can make auditors more
sensitive to fraud risks.12 Hammersley (2011) finds that auditor responsiveness to fraud risks
partially depends on the diagnosticity of fraud risk factors and to auditor fraud knowledge.
When SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002) superseded SAS No. 82 (1997), the fraud triangle
became integrated into fraud risk assessment guidance in auditing standards. Although current
auditing standards present the risk factors for fraud motivation as a single category
12

This finding in both of these studies is in a setting where fraud risk is considered low. In a high fraud risk setting,
disaggregation of risks into fraud triangle categories is not necessary to elicit relatively greater fraud risk
assessments.
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(Incentives/Pressures), this present study investigates whether auditors make different risk
assessments and auditing decisions when top managers are under a pressure to avoid a potential
loss, rather than under an incentive for a potential gain. Even in his original work, Cressey
(1953) recognized a difference between two types of non-sharable problems,13 which he called
“status-seeking/gaining” or “status-maintaining” (Cressey 1953, pp. 36, 53, 75). Status-seeking
can be fulfilled by realizing an incentive for a potential gain, while status-maintaining is
characterized by a desire to avoid a potential loss. Cressey found the more common driver of
embezzlement to be status-maintaining non-shareable problems, rather than status-gaining nonsharable problems (Cressey 1953, p.53). The root sources of status maintaining non-sharable
problems included violations of ascribed obligations, problems resulting from personal failure,
and problems resulting from business reversals (Cressey 1953, pp. 36-52). Status is often
measured in terms of wealth and compensation. Auditors in this current study are asked to assess
their perceptions of fraud risks associated with status-gaining incentives for gain, or statusmaintaining pressures of avoiding a potential loss.

13

Gains or losses could be financial or nonfinancial in nature (Cressey 1953, p 35).

19

3. LITERATURE REVIEW—EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND FRAUD
3.1 Consideration of Executive Compensation in Fraud Auditing Standards
Auditing standards include few fraud risk factor examples that directly reference
management compensation. An example of a fraud risk factor example focused on compensation
from SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002, AU 316.85) follows:
Significant portions of [management’s] compensation (for example, bonuses, stock
options, and earn-out arrangements) being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets
for stock price, operating results, financial position, or cash flow.

More recently issued public company auditing standards make additional requirements of
auditors to consider executive compensation. PCAOB auditing standards concerning auditor
consideration of executive compensation as a potential motivator of financial statement fraud are
primarily contained in the following PCAOB standards: (1) AS No. 12 – Identifying and
Assessing Risks of Material Misstatements (PCAOB 2010a), (2) AS No. 18 – Related Parties,
Amendments to Certain PCAOB Auditing Standards, and Other Amendments (PCAOB 2014),
and (3) AS No. 14 – Evaluating Audit Results (PCAOB 2010b). Between 2010 and 2014, the
PCAOB increased auditing requirements regarding the consideration of executive compensation
in fraud risk assessment.
AS No. 12 (PCAOB 2010a), before being amended in 2014, states that the auditor should
“consider” performing procedures such as: “Obtaining an understanding of compensation
arrangements with senior management, including incentive compensation arrangements, changes
or adjustments to these arrangements, and special bonuses.” (PCAOB 2010a, p. A5 – 5) This
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standard also highlights the importance of understanding company performance measures, such
as those that form the basis for contractual commitments or incentive compensation
arrangements, because these can affect the risk of material misstatement by creating incentives or
pressures for management to manipulate accounts or disclosures in order to achieve certain
performance targets. AS No. 12 also reiterates the SAS No. 99 events or conditions representing
fraud risk factors, including indications of : “(1) an incentive or pressure to perpetrate fraud, (2)
an opportunity to carry out the fraud, or (3) an attitude or rationalization that justifies the
fraudulent action.” (PCAOB 2010a, p. A5 – 27)
AS No. 18 (PCAOB 2014) amends the AS No. 12 (PCAOB 2010a) recommendation to
consider executive compensation, by making it a requirement to obtain an understanding of the
company’s financial transactions and relationship with its executive officers. The new standard
states that these procedures should include reading employment and compensation contracts and
proxy statements involving executive compensation. These procedures are designed to support
the auditor’s assessment of management bias or risk of material misstatement such as the risk
that management might seek accounting results solely to boost its own compensation. AS No. 18
states: “A company’s financial relationships and transactions with its executive officers (as one
example, executive compensation) can create incentives and pressures for executive officers to
meet financial targets, which can result in risks of material misstatements of a company’s
financial statements.” (PCAOB 2014, p.5)
AS No. 14 (PCAOB 2010b) also states that qualitative factors to be considered by the
auditor in evaluation of materiality of uncorrected misstatements include: “A misstatement that
has the effect of increasing management’s compensation, for example, by satisfying the
requirements for the award of bonuses or other forms of incentive compensation.” (PCAOB
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2010b, p. A7 – 17) “Likewise, an understanding of compensation arrangements with senior
management often can provide important information about incentives and pressures on
management to manipulate the financial statements.” (PCAOB 2010b, p. A10 – 33)
3.2 Research on Executive Compensation and Auditing
Dikolli et al. (2004) experimentally find that audit risk is assessed relatively higher and
more extensive audit plans are selected, for clients who pay executive bonuses based on financial
performance measures, rather than on non-financial performance measures. They cannot
determine whether these results are attributable to differences between financial versus nonfinancial performance measures or to the ease with which financial performance measure could
be manipulated by management.
Archival research demonstrates that it is executive ownership of equity positions in the
company managed, not current compensation and bonuses, which have the most significant
impact on change in executive wealth at public companies (Hall and Liebman 1998; Core and
Guay 1999; Core et al. 2003; Billings et al. 2014). This fact implies that stock and option
ownership incentives should be of interest to auditors assessing fraud risk associated with
executive compensation incentives.
Kannan et al. (2014) find no association between audit fees (reflecting the cost, quantity
and quality of audit effort) and CEO and CFO delta incentives (defined as the sensitivity of the
change in value of executive stock and option portfolios to changes in stock price).14 Billings et
al. (2014) find that CFO delta equity ownership incentives, but not CEO delta equity ownership
14

Kannan et al. (2014) also consider the relationship between audit fees and vega incentives (the sensitivity of the
value of executive stock and option portfolios to stock return volatility). The vega results are mixed and Guay
(1999) states that vegas are subject to estimation problems and vegas in this context are almost always economically
insignificant.
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incentives are associated with audit effort, as proxied by the pricing of audit services, suggesting
increasing audit risk with increasing CFO equity ownership incentives. CFO influence, measured
as the proportion of CFO compensation relative to the other top four executives, is also
associated with audit fees, but premium audit fees are not associated with CEO influence,
suggesting that auditors perceive a risk of CFOs engaging in earnings manipulations in response
to their own equity incentives.
3.3 Research on Executive Compensation and Financial Statement Fraud
Numerous studies evaluate various executive compensation components, and whether
executive compensation is associated with intentional misstatements of company earnings by
executives. One might expect that top executives could be motivated to overstate company
earnings in order to increase their own performance-based compensation, such as bonus, stock
and option grants, and changes in the value of stock and stock options owned. Conversely, a
highly compensated executive could be reluctant to overstate earnings due to risk of discovery
and resulting restatements, which might threaten the continued employment of the executive.15
Even when an executive is reluctant to misstate earnings, the size of the impact of earnings on
certain compensation components could become so large that he/she would succumb to the
temptation to intentionally cause an earnings misstatement. Figure 3 summarizes studies
analyzing whether executive compensation is associated with intentional misstatements of

15

Hennes et al. (2008) find that during the 13 months surrounding a fraud restatements, 49 percent of CEOs and 64
percent of CFOs turnover their positions (compared to 8 percent and 12 percent, respectively, for error
restatements). They also find that during a four year period surrounding fraud restatements, 91 percent of companies
have turnover in either their CEO or CFO.
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earnings. Overall, these study results are mixed, regarding whether specific compensation
components are associated with intentional earnings misstatements.16
Bonus Plans
Holthausen et al. (1995) find that managers manipulate earnings downward during a
current period once bonuses reach a maximum payout level under a compensation plan for that
period, consistent with bonus earnings management research by Healy (1985); but unlike Healy
(1985), Holthausen et al. (1995) do not find that managers manipulate current earnings for a
period downward when minimum bonus targets are unreachable for that period. However, Core
et al. (2003) conclude that very little of a CEOs total compensation incentives come from cash
pay (salary and bonus), and that the largest balance of public company CEO compensations is
comprised of equity ownership of stock and options of the company managed. This leads one to
consider the following studies.
Stock and Stock Options Plans
Johnson et al. (2009) study compensation and SEC Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and find that the financial reporting misconduct described in
AAERs is associated with executive stock ownership (but not with executive ownership of
restricted stock). Erickson et al. (2006) find no association between executive stock and option
portfolio delta17 and AAERs. They conclude that equity holdings do not provide

16

There is a larger body of research focused on executive compensation and earnings management, in which case a
bias in reported earnings is unintentional or is not described as fraud. However the earnings management studies
summarized in Figure 3 are focused on intentional misstatements or indicators of intentional misstatements of
earnings.
17
Portfolio delta is described as the change in a manager’s wealth from stock and option ownership relative to a
change in price of the stock of the company managed.
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Figure 3: Summary of Compensation and Fraudulent Financial Reporting Literature
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incentives to misreport. Johnson et al. (2009) find that stock holdings—not options holdings—
are associated with financial statement fraud. They also find that this management fraud is more
often committed following declines in company performance. A period of decline in
performance represents a period when the managed firm is in a loss position relative to an
expectations reference point of recent earnings levels. This loss position from a reference point is
consistent with the concept of the loss domain described by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
under prospect theory.
Denis et al. (2006) find that stock option incentives to managers are associated with fraud
allegations against their companies managed. Burnes and Kedia (2006) conclude that the
sensitivity of CEO option portfolios to stock price (portfolio delta) is positively related to
propensity to misreport. Other forms of compensation are not found to be associated with
misreporting. Harris and Bromiley (2007) find that earnings restatements are associated with
option value as a percent of total compensation for managers. Efendi et al. (2007) find that
restatements are associated with option intrinsic value and option delta, but that there is no
association between the CEO’s portfolio delta and restatements. Armstrong et al. (2013) find a
strong association between vega18 effects of compensation and misreporting, which subsumes the
delta effects of compensation structure.
O’Connor et al. (2006) find that option value owned by the CEO is associated with
restatements under certain conditions: when the CEO is the board chair and sole option holder,
and when the CEO and other board members receive options. Armstrong et al. (2010) find no
association between CEO equity compensation portfolio delta and accounting irregularities, and

18

Armstrong et al. (2013) define vega effects as the sensitivity of a manager’s wealth to changes in stock volatility,
and defines delta effects as the sensitivity of a manager’s wealth to changes in stock price.
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find some evidence that irregularities are less frequent at firms where CEO’s have relatively
higher levels of equity-based compensation. Gillett and Uddin (2005) find that compensation
structure is not a good indicator of manager intention to misreport, but that CFOs of larger firms
are more likely to report fraudulently.
The contradictory results of these studies comparing compensation components and
misreporting leads one to seek additional omitted variables as an explanation. Figure 3 reveals
that many of the studies use restatements as a proxy for fraud, but do not differentiate between
fraud and nonfraud restatements.19 Whether there is management intention to mislead is an
omitted variable in many of these studies because it is difficult to detect. These study findings
(except for Johnson et al. 2009) also do not differentiate between periods of increasing or
decreasing earnings when comparing compensation components to misreporting, and such
comparisons are difficult because stock and option incentives relate to multiple periods which
often include both increasing and decreasing earnings periods. Prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979) explains that managers will have a greater motivation to avoid reporting losses
than to realize equal value gains. So, distinguishing between periods of increasing or decreasing
earnings in these compensation and fraud studies is also a potential source of omitted variable in
the analyses.
Taken together, the compensation and fraud research demonstrates evidence that various
compensation components can have a statistically significant association with various proxies for
financial statement fraud. One goal of this study is to determine whether financial statement
auditors incorporate their knowledge of top management compensation structure into their fraud
risk assessments, and what are the benefits of doing so.
19

The primary factor that distinguishes fraud from error is whether the action that results in a misstatement is
intentional or unintentional (AICPA, 2002, AU 316.05).
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4. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
4.1 Fraud Risk Factor Usefulness
The terms “red flags for fraud” and “fraud risk factors” have been used interchangeably
over time, with the term “fraud risk factor” becoming the more common term used upon the
issuance of SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002). McKey (2010) states that current fraud audit approaches
are predicated on the belief that specific identified fraud risks, in the form of red flags for fraud,
help predict overall risk of fraud. Pincus (1989) observes that practitioners and standards setters
refer to red flags as indicators of fraud. However, Albrecht and Romney (1986) find that of the
87 red flags that they identify as being used by audit firms in practice at the time, only one-third
are considered by auditors to be significant predictors of fraud cases. Hogan et al. (2008) reviews
financial statement fraud literature and observes that while red flags for fraud are observed
frequently, their presence usually does not lead to a conclusion of fraud. This fact could
understandably desensitize auditors using red flag checklists. Pincus (1989) and Hogan et al.
(2008) conclude that red flag checklists for fraud can be dysfunctional because auditors fail to
expand their thinking beyond the checklist.
The usefulness of fraud risk factors assessed in auditing literature has depended on what
risk factors are used and how auditors have used them. Pincus (1989) finds that use of a red flag
checklist increases the comprehensiveness and uniformity of data acquisition, but in a case where
fraud is present, auditors using a checklist of red flags assess fraud risk lower than auditors
without the checklist. Boritz and Timoshenko (2014) conclude that appropriately designed and
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adequately customized checklists, applied strategically, can be effective. Apostolou et al. (2001)
asked auditors to rate the relative importance of fraud risk factors from SAS No. 82 (AICPA
1997),20 and they find auditors indicate that factors related to management characteristics and
influence over the control environment were twice as important as operating and financial
characteristics of the organization, and were four times more important than industry condition
characteristics. These relative importance levels attributed to categories of fraud risk factors were
not significantly different between Big 5 auditors, regional/local auditors and internal auditors,
and were not related to the years of audit experience. Zimbelman (1997) initially finds that prior
to the issuance of SAS No. 82, auditors were not sensitive to high versus low fraud risk cases
when using SAS No. 82 fraud risk factors, but rather, inefficiently increased overall planned
testing irrespective of fraud risk assessment levels. Glover et al. (2003) find that, two years after
implementation of SAS No. 82, auditors became more sensitive to differences in fraud risk levels
indicated by SAS No. 82 fraud risk factors.
SAS No. 99 reflects nearly all of the same fraud risk factor examples as SAS No. 82,
except that SAS No. 99 reorganizes them under the three categories of the fraud triangle model:
opportunity, attitude/rationalization, and incentive/pressure (motivation) to commit fraud. Wilks
and Zimbelman (2004) find that auditors who make three separate fraud triangle model element
risk assessments are more sensitive to opportunity and incentive/pressure fraud risk factors than
auditors that make only a single overall fraud risk assessment. Favere-Marchesi (2013) finds that
auditors who make three separate fraud triangle model element risk assessments are more
sensitive to opportunity and incentive/pressure fraud risk factors than are auditors who only
20

SAS No. 82 was superseded by SAS No. 99 in 2002. Both standards, titled Considerations for Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit, list approximately the same fraud risk factor examples for financial statement fraud, but
in SAS No. 82, these factors are grouped in the following categories: 1) management’s characteristics and influence
over the control environment, 2) industry conditions, and 3) operating characteristics and financial stability.
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categorize fraud risk factors into the three fraud triangle model categories before making a single
overall fraud risk assessment.
4.2 Fraud Risk Factor Focus: Individual or Organizational
The Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) and the Favere-Marchesi (2013) studies measure
differences in fraud risk assessment ratings between high fraud risk and low fraud risk cases.
Their definition of high versus low fraud risk is important to the fraud risk factor focus research
question of this current study. These two prior studies rely on construction of high versus low
fraud cases based on a pilot study described by Wilks and Zimbelman (2004). This pilot study
asked 12 practicing audit managers from three of the Big 5 firms to rate the importance of 40
fraud risk factors obtained from the exposure draft version of SAS No. 99. Risk factors that were
considered relatively unimportant in the pilot study were used to build the low risk case, while
risk factors that were considered relatively important in the pilot study were added to build the
high risk case. Following are the fraud risk factors presented by Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) in
the low fraud risk case:





High degree of competition, market saturation, or declining margins
Significant declines in customer demand
Need to obtain debt or equity financing
Marginal ability to meet debt repayment or debt covenant requirements.

Following are the fraud risk factors presented by Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) in the high fraud
risk case:




Significant portions of management’s compensation being contingent upon aggressive
targets for stock price, operating results, financial position, or cash flow
Management’s personal guarantee of significant debts of the entity
Excessive pressure on management to meet financial targets.

When evaluating motivation for fraud, the fraud risk factors considered to be relatively
unimportant by auditors were ones that describe potential impacts on the organization, while the
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fraud risk factors considered to be relatively important were ones that that describe potential
impact on individual managers. Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) do not identify this fact and do not
explain why auditors view certain fraud risk factors as relatively unimportant, and others as
relatively important.
Mental model theory provides a potential explanation for why auditors perceive some
fraud risk factors as important, while others are perceived as relatively unimportant. “A mental
model is a representation of some domain or situation that supports understanding, reasoning,
and prediction” (Markman and Gentner 2001, p228). “To this end, human reasoners tend to
generate a conclusion that maintains the information conveyed by the premises, that re-express it
more parsimoniously, and that establish something not originally explicit” (Johnson-Laird and
Byrne 1991, p194). Mental models are subjective, internal representations of a system of causal
relations that are qualitative, incomplete and substitute more familiar attributes for attributes that
would be present in a more formal scientific model (Markman and Gentner 2001; Krishnan et al.
2005). Mental models are likely to include short causal chains, while omitting steps in longer,
more complex causal chains (Krishnan et al. 2005).
A red flag for fraud, or fraud risk factor, is the initial step in an auditor’s mental model
about a fraud hypothesis. Since a decision to misreport earnings is made by an individual
manager or managers, not an organization, a fraud risk factor that describes a condition
impacting the organization invokes a less direct, more complex mental model of misreporting
motivation than does a fraud risk factor that directly describes a potential impact on individual
managers. For example, a fraud risk factor could explicitly state that missing an entity earnings
target that also serves as a CFO compensation benchmark would lead to a decrease in CFO
compensation. This is a short and direct mental model for misreporting motivation of the CFO.
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Contrast that example with a more complex one. Consider an observed fraud risk factor of
increasing industry competitiveness, which would lead to pressure on product pricing, which
would reduce product margins, which could in turn decrease entity earnings, which are a
benchmark for CFO compensation targets, which would negatively impact CFO compensation.
This is a less direct mental model about how the initial fraud risk factor, industry

Figure 4: Direct and Indirect Mental Model Examples
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competitiveness, could impact CFO motivation to misreport. In an experiment involving
accounting judgments, Farrell et al. (2007) note that adding links in the causal chain of a mental
model adds to the complexity of the mental representation, placing greater demands on working
memory. They also note that an increased number of logical steps within a mental model make it
more complex and uncertain.
Most financial statement fraud is perpetrated by, or at least involves, the very top levels
of management (Beasley et al. 2010; Perri 2013; PCAOB 2014). Considering the mental model
concept of directness as applied to fraud risk factors and motivation for fraud decisions, and
considering the lack of reaction to organizational level fraud risk factors in studies (Albrecht and
Romney 1986; Apostolou 2001; Wilks and Zimbelman 2004), auditors are expected to more
easily process misreporting risks that directly affect managers responsible for the reporting.
Conversely, auditors are expected to have more difficulty processing misreporting risks that
affect the organization, but only indirectly affect managers responsible for reporting. Therefore,
risks for which the impact on the reporting manager can more easily be processed and identified
are expected to be rated as relatively greater risks, and risks for which the impact on the
reporting manager are less easily processed and identified are expected to be rated as relatively
lower risks.
4.3 Fraud Risk Factor Motivation Type: Incentive or Pressure
Studies have identified differences between positive and negative framing of audit
assertions on auditors’ behavior. Fukukawa and Mock (2011) find that auditors evaluating a
negatively stated audit assertion (such as: “Test whether there is a material misstatement in the
recording of sales transactions”) exhibit more skepticism than auditors who are given the same
audit step stated positively (such as: “Test whether sales transactions are accurately recorded”).
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Bedard and Graham (2002) find that auditors using a decision aid with a negative orientation
find more fraud risks than those using a decision aid with a positive orientation. Schema theory
(Alba and Hasher 1983) explains that expectations brought to a task influence how information is
used, and more negative expectations lead to relatively more use of negative information. This
relatively greater attention to negative information is consistent with a prediction that a fraud risk
factor indicating a pressure to avoid a potential loss will receive a relatively greater risk
assessment from an auditor than a fraud risk factor indicating incentive for a gain.
Additional insight to the preceding explanation for the direction of auditor attention, is to
understand how loss aversion in human nature can affect management decision-making, and to
observe whether auditor fraud risk assessments is influenced by differences between incentive
for a gain versus a pressure of a loss for managers. Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky
1979) provides an explanation of individual decision making under risk, which is developed for
simple prospects with monetary outcomes under uncertainty, but can be extended to more
involved choices. An essential feature of prospect theory is that decision motivation for potential
payoff choices are driven by potential changes in wealth or welfare from a given reference point.
A salient characteristic of attitudes to changes in welfare is that losses loom larger than gains in
human minds. This is described as a value function (utility per dollar function) that is steeper for
losses than for gains.
Prospect theory can be used to predict that a manager would have a greater motivation to
avoid declines in compensation, welfare and reputation, than to attain equivalent increases in
compensation, welfare or reputation. Prospect theory, then, also suggests that a top manager
facing a decision about whether to misreport earnings would face greater psychological
motivation to do so under pressure to avoid a negative outcome from a reference point, than
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under an incentive to produce an equivalent value positive outcome from the same reference
point. Individual level reference point examples include current level of compensation or wealth.
Organizational level reference point examples include attaining positive earnings, expected
earnings or target stock valuation. Studies demonstrate that managers, laborers, gamblers and
other decision-makers exhibit behavior described by prospect theory in many settings, including:
finance, insurance, industrial organization, labor supply, negotiations, investing, and other
settings (Barberis 2013). This dissertation seeks not to predict management behavior, but rather,
to determine whether auditor evaluation of fraud risk factors is intuitively influenced by these
prospect theory explanations of human loss aversion that could affect the degree of management
motivation to misreport.
It is reasonable to ask whether an auditor’s intuition about human nature could impact
his/her thinking about auditee manager motivation. Kahneman (2011) describes that humans
exhibit two systems of thinking. The fast system, or System 1, operates automatically and
quickly, with little or no effort or sense of voluntary control. System 1 is driven by both emotion
and unconscious recall of human experience. The slow system, or System 2, allocates attention
to the effortful mental activities that are demanded of it, including logic and computations. The
difference in auditor assessment of management’s motivation driven by the desire to avoid a
potential loss, rather than realize a potential gain, is expected to relate to the auditors own
unconscious knowledge of human loss aversion as controlled by System 1 thinking.
4.4 Interaction of Fraud Risk Factor Focus and Motivation Type
Prospect theory explains risk-reward decision-making of individuals and suggests that
auditors would assess pressures of loss impacting individual top managers differently than
incentives for a gain to those managers. However, as described in the preceding Fraud Risk
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Factor Focus section of this paper, the mental model for fraud motivation is more direct for risk
factors focused on managers, and less direct for risk factors focused on the organization
generally. This concept of mental model directness suggests that any difference between auditor
perception of misreporting risk under pressure versus incentive would be least difficult to
identify when fraud risk factors are focused directly on top managers, and more difficult to
identify when fraud risk factors are focused on the organization. Therefore, whether fraud risk
factors indicating pressures are assessed as higher risks than those indicating incentives, should
depend on whether the fraud risk factor is focused on the organization or on individual top
managers, leading to the following interaction hypotheses for risk assessment:
H1a:

Auditors will assess motivation-for-misreporting risks as being greater
when they are framed as pressures to avoid potential losses than when they
are framed as incentives for potential gains, when these risks are focused
on top managers, but not when they are focused on the organization.

Likewise, the link between risk assessment and audit planning leads to the following hypothesis:
H1b:

Auditors will make more extensive risk-responsive audit planning
decisions when motivation-for-misreporting risks are framed as pressures
to avoid potential losses rather than when they are framed as incentives for
potential gains, when these risks are focused on top managers, but not
when they are focused on the organization.

4.5 Incentive and Pressure in Executive Compensation
Agency theory supports linking top executive wealth to the value of the firm being
managed in order to reduce costs that arise when agents (managers) pursue their own interests
rather than the interests of the owners (shareholders) of the firm (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
This alignment is achieved when compensation for top managers is structured in such ways that
payoffs to top managers are highly aligned with financial performance payoffs to the
organization and its shareholders. When payoffs are so aligned, auditors should assess fraud risk
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factors focused on the organization as being one-and-the-same as fraud risk factors focused on
individual top managers. However, the indirectness of the mental model for fraud motivation for
risk factors focused on the organization, if great enough, will prevent auditors from incorporating
their knowledge of high executive compensation alignment into auditor risk assessments.
Auditors should incorporate the degree of compensation alignment into their judgments and
decision-making processes, but the indirectness of the mental model for compensation incentives
and pressures supports a prediction that they will not. Therefore, H2a predicts that auditors will
not incorporate knowledge of high compensation alignment between the organization and top
managers, and will assess organizationally focused risk factors no differently than when there is
minimal compensation alignment between the organization and its top managers. The term
“highly aligned” (“minimally aligned”) in hypotheses 2a and 2b means that compensation
payoffs to top managers are highly aligned (minimally aligned) with financial statement payoffs
to the organization and its shareholders/owners.
H2a:

When fraud risk factors are focused on the organization, auditors will
assess motivation-for-fraud risk no differently, whether top manager
compensation is highly aligned or minimally aligned.

Similarly, H2b predicts that when management has high compensation alignment auditors will
make audit planning decisions which are no different than when management has low
compensation alignment.
H2b:

When fraud risk factors are focused on the organization, auditors will
make audit planning decisions that are no different, whether top
manager compensation is highly aligned or minimally aligned.

These hypotheses will be tested in an experimental setting described in the following section.
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5. RESEARCH METHOD
5.1 Participants
Recruitment of experimental participants was initiated by request to the alumni advisory
council boards to the schools of accountancy at two public universities, one in the southeastern
U.S. and one in the central U.S. Representatives of public accounting firms serving on these
advisory boards agreed to email a link for the online study instrument to auditing/assurance
seniors, managers and senior managers at their firms. Under this distribution method, eight
partners and two staff level positions also completed the study instrument and their results are
included in analysis. One firm elected not to participate in the electronic distribution of the
research study, but instead, had 31 senior associates complete a paper version of the study at an
annual training meeting conducted by the firm. This distribution and collection of the paper
version of the instrument was conducted by the principal investigator and author of this study.
The electronic and paper instruments are identical, except as described under the “Experimental
Instrument” subheading to follow. The manipulated treatment conditions in this between subjects
experiment were randomly distributed to participants under both, the electronic and the paper
instrument delivery processes for the study.
Participants are 132 auditing/assurance professionals from U.S. offices of public
accounting firms.21 Sixty-two (47.3%) are employed by Big 4 firms; 59 (45.0%) by national or

21

Participant demographic statistics and percent of total statistics are based on 131 responses to the demographic
questions. A total of 137 participants started the experiment, but five of those did not complete a sufficient portion
of the experiment to enable collection of a single dependent variable.
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regional firms; and 10 (7.7%) by single office firms. The mean years of public accounting
experience is 5.8 years, with the following breakdown by position:

Table 1: Number of Public Accounting Firm Participants by Position and Firm Size
Participants From

Staff
Senior
Manager
Senior Manager
Director
Partner
Total

Total
Participants
2
71
33
15
2
8
131

National/
Regional
Firms

Big 4
Firms
1
47
10
3
0
1
62

0
19
20
11
2
7
59

Single
Office
Firms
1
5
3
1
0
0
10

One hundred twenty participants (91.6%) report that their firms conduct audits of public
companies while the remainder of participants were unsure or did not respond. Sixty eight
(51.9%) reported having worked on at least one engagement in a public company setting within
the past year. Participants report a mean of 3.0 as the number of engagements during their career
in which they have investigated potentially material misstatements of earnings that were
suspected to have been intentional. The audit experience of the participants qualifies them for the
context of this study. There are no significant differences in dependent variable means across
position levels.
Table 2 that follows reflects that there was not a significant difference in mean
motivation-for-fraud risk assessments between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firm participants. However,
there were significant differences between these two groups for five of eight dependent variable
measures of auditor decisions.
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Table 2: Dependent Variable Measures for Big 4 versus Non-Big 4 Firm Participants

Dependent Variables (a)

Big 4 Firm Participants
(Standard
Mean deviation) n =

Non-Big 4 Firm Participants
(Standard
Mean
Mean deviation)
n = Difference Sig. (b)

Motivation-for-fraud risk assessment

7.7

(1.6)

61

8.1

(1.4)

69

(.4)

.145

Number of positive confirmations to distributors

51

(31)

60

51

(29)

69

0

.989

distributors (% of total confirmations)

47%

(.07)

59

49%

(.08)

69

(2%)

.175

Difference in % of sub cash examined
for A/R from dist. less from non-dist.

1%

(.04)

61

3%

(.07)

69

(2%)

.134

Number of days past year-end to
examine subsequent cash receipts

54

(15)

61

59

(13)

69

(5)

.026 *

Number of days past year-end to
examine sales returns

53

(15)

61

58

(13)

69

3

.046 *

Hours budgeted for computer automated audit
techniques or forensic accounting procedures

22

(34)

62

10

(8)

69

24

.004 *

Hours budgeted to conduct interviews of client
personnel about sales and accounts receivable

9

(9)

61

5

(4)

69

4

.000 *

Hours budgeted for all sales/accounts receivable
audit procedures

123

(25)

61

112

(25)

68

11

.011 *

Percentage of positive confirmations to

(a) The dependent variables are explained further in this Research Method section of this paper.
(b) This is the ANOVA F-test significance level for the difference in means between Big 4 and non-Big 4 firm participants.
* Indicates a significant difference tests at an alpha of .05.

Of 132 participants completing the study, 68 elected to enter an appreciation drawing at
the end of the study. Participants who volunteered to enter the appreciation drawing were
directed to a separate website to enter contact information for entering the drawing. A total of
eight participants out of 68 were winners of the appreciation drawing, each receiving a $250 gift
card.
5.2 Experimental Instrument Format and Delivery
Most participants completed the study by accessing a website link emailed to them by a
senior member of their firm. The electronic version of the study was administered with software
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from Qualtrics.com. Experimental materials included a brief company case,22 three audit work
papers listing fraud risk factors previously deemed present or not present by a hypothetical audit
team, and a series of requests for decisions regarding certain audit parameters for the audit of
accounts receivable and sales of the company presented in the case. The instrument concludes
with questions about participant experience and manipulation check questions. The paper version
of the instrument is included in Appendix C to this paper. The only difference between the paper
Table 3: Dependent Variable Measures for Paper versus Electronic Instrument Users

Dependent Variables (a)
Motivation-for-fraud risk assessment

Paper Instruments
(Standard
Mean deviation) n =

Electronic Instruments
(Standard
Mean
Mean deviation) n = Difference Sig. (b)

7.53

(1.61)

30

8.06

(1.47) 101

(.53)

.774

55

(40)

29

50

(27) 100

5

.424

distributors (% of total confirmations)

48%

(.05)

28

48%

(.08) 100

0

.992

Difference in % of sub cash examined
for A/R from dist. less from non-dist.

1%

(.03)

30

3%

(.07) 100

(2%)

.310

Number of days past year-end to
examine subsequent cash receipts

52

(10)

30

58

(15) 100

(6)

.068

Number of days past year-end to
examine sales returns

52

(10)

30

57

(15) 100

(5)

.062

Hours budgeted for computer automated audit
techniques or forensic accounting procedures

26

(43)

31

12

(15) 100

14

.008 *

Hours budgeted to conduct interviews of client
personnel about sales and accounts receivable

9

(7)

30

6

(7) 100

3

.030 *

127

(26)

30

114

13

.019 *

Number of positive confirmations to distributors
Percentage of positive confirmations to

Hours budgeted for all sales/accounts receivable audit
audit procedures

(25)

99

(a) The dependent variables are explained further in this Research Method section of this paper.
(b) This is the ANOVA F-test significance level for the difference in means between participants using the electronic version versus paper version of the instrument.
* Indicates a significant difference tests at an alpha of .05.

22

This case is based on a company fraud case from an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (Bausch
and Lomb in 1997), and is similar to cases modified for a variety of auditor research by Wilks and Zimbelman
(2004), Carpenter (2007), Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009), Hammersley et al. (2010), and Favere-Marchesi (2013).
The case was updated to a current time period and the industry setting was modified.
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version and electronic version of the instrument is present on the top of page six of the
instrument in Appendix C. Under the heading “RECAP” participants receiving hard copy
instruments are asked to look back to pages 3, 4, and 5 of the instrument to review three of their
prior fraud risk assessments, before making one final overall fraud risk assessment. In the
electronic version of the instrument, these three prior risk assessments by the participant were
automatically reported for review by participants on page 6, before they made an overall fraud
risk assessment.
Table 3 above reflects that there was not a significant difference in mean motivation-forfraud risk assessments between participants using the paper or electronic version of the
instrument. However, there were significant differences between these two groups for three of
eight dependent variable measures of auditor decisions. The final three dependent variables for
budgeted hours were significantly larger for participants using the paper version of the
instrument, rather than the electronic version of the instrument. These hourly budget dependent
variables were also significantly larger for the Big 4 firm participants relative to non-Big 4 firm
participants in Table 2 above. All 31 participants that used the paper version of the instrument
were from a Big 4 firm, where the instrument was administered in a single sitting. The results in
the comparisons in Tables 2 and 3 support the conclusion that Big 4 firm auditors budget
relatively higher numbers of hours for auditing sales and accounts receivable in this setting than
do non-Big 4 firm auditors.
This company case describes a public company traded on the NASDAQ which exhibits
evidence of intentional premature revenue recognition through distributor channel stuffing23
strategies implemented by management. Increases in current period revenue and receivables are
23

Channel stuffing is an overstatement of sales achieved through shipment of unwanted inventory to customers,
which could be subject to return in a later period, or which violate other revenue recognition criteria.
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evident in the case, and management explains that marketing programs instituted prior to yearend have incented distributors to accelerate purchases. It is unclear whether these purchases
might be subject to return or accounts receivable collection problems in the subsequent period.
Experimental materials were identical for all participants except for the conditions manipulated
between groups.
5.3 Manipulation of Fraud Risk Factors for Fraud Motivation
The fraud risk factors on the incentives/pressures work paper were manipulated into four
different groups using two experimental factors: 1) fraud motivation focus (organizational or top
management) and 2) fraud motivation type (incentive or pressure), resulting in the following four
experimental groups:





Group A) Incentive for a potential gain to the organization
Group B) Pressure of a potential loss to the organization
Group C) Incentive for a potential gain to individual top managers
Group D) Pressure of a potential loss to individual top managers

The fraud risk factors (FRFs) presented to each of the four participant groups are listed in Figure
5. Each FRF is based on a FRF example found in SAS No. 99. The first FRF considers a high
degree of competition or market saturation. The second FRF considers guarantees of entity debt.
The third FRF considers a marginal ability to meet debt covenant requirements. The fourth FRF
considers sales and profitability goals.
For each FRF in Figure 5, there are four versions, one for each experimental group (A, B,
C, and D). Each FRF is rewritten from four different perspectives to achieve the fraud risk factor
focus and motivation type necessary for each group manipulation. Each version of a fraud
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Figure 5, Panel A: Manipulation of the First Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Factor
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Incentive for Gain . . .

CD

declining margins in the industry, and top management believes that
USI annual earnings will decresase by 15% this year if a new
marketing strategy is not successfully implemented.
A high degree of competition and market saturation has led to
declining margins in the industry, and top management believes that
its own total compensation will decrease by 15% this year if a new
marketing strategy is not successfully implemented.

Groups
Pressure of Loss . . .
A B A high degree of competition and market saturation has led to

(b) This SAS No. 99 fraud risk factor was used as a low risk factor in the Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) experiment, and was rated as a relatively less important fraud risk factor in their related pilot study.

(a) This is one representative fraud risk factor from the 15 examples listed in SAS No. 99 (AU 316) for financial statement fraud.

A high degree of competition and market saturation has led to
. . . to the
declining margins in the industry, but top management believes
Organization that USI annual earnings will increase by 15% this year if a new
marketing strategy is successfully implemented.
A high degree of competition and market saturation has led to
declining margins in the industry, but top management believes
. . . to Top
that its own total compensation will increase by 15% this year
Managers
if a new marketing strategy is successfully implemented.

Manipulation #1

Original SAS No. 99 Fraud Risk Factor Example (a)
Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating conditions, such as (or indicated by) the following: High degree of competition or market
saturation, accompanied by declining margins

(b)

The white box below is an original SAS No. 99 fraud risk factor. The shaded boxes contain four versions of a similar manipulated fraud risk factor, one for each experimental group A, B, C or D.

Figure 5, Panel A
Manipulation Comparison Between Groups

Figure 5, Panel B: Manipulation of a Second Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Factor
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Incentive for Gain . . .

CD

Maintaining an adequate interest coverage ratio (EBITDA/interest
expense) has been difficult, and failure to achieve a ratio of 1.5
times for 2014 will result in the establishment of a personal loan
guarantee by the USI CEO on the debt of USI, which guarantee is
equal in size to 25% of the total personal net worth of the CEO.

expense) has been difficult, and failure to achieve a ratio of 1.5 for
2014 will result in the establishment of a loan guarantee by USI on
debt of its employee stock ownership plan, which guarantee is
equal in size to 25% of USI's total balance sheet equity.

Groups
Pressure of Loss . . .
A B Maintaing an adequate interest coverage ratio (EBITDA/interest

(c) This SAS No. 99 fraud risk factor was used as a high risk factor in the Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) experiment, and was rated as a relatively more important fraud risk factor in their related pilot study.

(b) Not used for this panel.

(a) This is one representative fraud risk factor from the 15 examples listed in SAS No. 99 (AU 316) for financial statement fraud.

Maintaining an adequate interest coverage ratio
(EBITDA/interest expense) has been difficult, but achieving a
. . . to the
ratio of 1.5 for 2014 will result in the release of USI from a
Organization loan guarantee it previously made on debt of its employee
stock ownership plan, which guarantee is equal to 25% of USI's
total balance sheet equity.
Maintaining an adequate interest coverage ratio
(EBITDA/interest expense) has been difficult, but achieving a
ratio of 1.5 for 2014 will result in the release of the USI CEO
. . . to Top
from a personal loan guarantee he previously made on the debt
Managers
of USI, which guarantee is equal in size to 25% of the total
personal net worth of the CEO.

Manipulation #2

Information available indicates that the personal financial situation of management or those charged with governance is threatened by the entity's financial performance arising from
the following: Personal guarantees of debts of the entity

Original SAS No. 99 Fraud Risk Factor Example (a)
(c)

The white box below is an original SAS No. 99 fraud risk factor. The shaded boxes contain four versions of a similar manipulated fraud risk factor, one for each experimental group A, B, C or D.

Figure 5, Panel B
Manipulation Comparison Between Groups

Figure 5, Panel C: Manipulation of a Third Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Factor
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Incentive for Gain . . .

CD

During the first three quarters, USI had a marginal ability to meet
financial statement debt covenant requirements, which if not met
within the 4th quarter will lead it to refinance debt at a higher
interest rate. The CFO expects the higher interest rate will result in
a 12% decrease in annual total compensation of its top five
executives.

financial statement debt covenant requirements, which if not met
within in the 4th quarter will lead it to refinance debt at a higher
interest rate. The CFO expects the higher interest rate would result
in a 12% decrease in USI earnings.

Groups
Pressure of Loss . . .
A B During the first three quarters, USI had a marginal ability to meet

(b) This SAS No. 99 fraud risk factor was used as a low risk factor in the Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) experiment, and was rated as a relatively less important fraud risk factor in their related pilot study.

(a) This is one representative fraud risk factor from the 15 examples listed in SAS No. 99 (AU 316) for financial statement fraud.

. . . to Top
Managers

During the first three quarters, USI had a marginal ability to
meet financial statement debt covenant requirements, which if
met within the 4th quarter will lead it to refinance its debt at a
lower interest rate. The CFO expects the lower interest rate
would result in a 12% increase in the annual total compensation
of its top five executives.

During the first three quarters, USI had a marginal ability to
meet financial statement debt covenant requirements, which if
. . . to the
met within the 4th quarter, will lead it to refinance its debt at a
Organization
lower interest rate. The CFO expects the lower interest rate
would result in a 12% increase in USI earnings.

Manipulation #3

Original SAS No. 99 Fraud Risk Factor Example (a)
Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third parties due to the following: Marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or
debt repayment or other debt covenant requirements

(b)

The white box below is an original SAS No. 99 fraud risk factor. The shaded boxes contain four versions of a similar manipulated fraud risk factor, one for each experimental group A, B, C or D.

Figure 5, Panel C
Manipulation Comparison Between Groups

Figure 5, Panel D: Manipulation of a Fourth Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Factor
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Incentive for Gain . . .

CD

There are management-favorable 3 year employment contracts in
place for the CEO and CFO. These employment contracts will be
voided and replaced with at-will employment agreements if USI
cannot meet a $285 million sales target for this year.

license required by USI to produce most of its products. The
contract will be voided and replaced with an ongoing voidable
agreement if the company cannot meet a $285 million sales target
for this year.

Groups
Pressure of Loss . . .
A B There is a 3 year contract, with favorable terms, for a technology

(c) This SAS No. 99 fraud risk factor was used as a high risk factor in the Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) experiment, and was rated as a relatively more important fraud risk factor in their related pilot study.

(b) Not used this panel.

(a) This is one representative fraud risk factor from the 15 examples listed in SAS No. 99 (AU 316) for financial statement fraud.

. . . to Top
Managers

There are at-will employment agreements in place for the CEO
and CFO. These at-will employment agreements will be
replaced with management-favorable 3 year employment
contracts if USI can meet a $285 million sales target for this
year.

There is an ongoing voidable agreement for a technology
license required by USI to produce most of its products. The
. . . to the
agreement will be renewed as a 3 year contract with favorable
Organization terms if the company can meet a $285 million sales target for
this year.

Manipulation #4

Management or operating personnel are under excessive pressure to meet financial targets established by those charged with governance, including sales or profitability incentive
goals.

Original SAS No. 99 Fraud Risk Factor Example (a)
(c)

The white box below is an original SAS No. 99 fraud risk factor. The shaded boxes contain four versions of a similar manipulated fraud risk factor, one for each experimental group A, B, C or D.

Figure 5, Panel D
Manipulation Comparison Between Groups

risk factor is written as identically as possible, except for the variation needed to produce the
focus and type manipulation for each group24. Page six, in Appendix C, reflects how the
motivation-for-fraud risk factors were presented to participants. The instrument presented in
Appendix C is for group D participants.
5.4 Manipulation of Compensation Alignment
Top management compensation is manipulated between two conditions—minimal
compensation alignment and high compensation alignment. Groups A, B, C and D, previously
described, receive a minimal compensation alignment treatment, while groups E and F receive a
highly aligned compensation treatment. Groups A, B, C, and D have a top management
compensation structure characterized as resulting in minimal alignment between performance
payoffs to top managers and financial statement earnings payoffs to the organization. This
minimally aligned compensation structure is 70 percent fixed compensation that will not vary
with company earnings, and also includes stock and options ownership by these executives,
which is valued at less than one times total annual compensation. Communication of this
treatment condition in the instrument is reflected in Figure 6.

24

Some of the fraud risk factor manipulations include an identical percentage increase or decrease in an outcome for
the organization or for top manager(s). Whether the identical value percentage manipulation for the organization and
for a manager represents an actual equal value payoff to a decision-making manager is ambiguous because it
depends on the level of stock ownership by the manager, and potentially, other unidentified factors. The perceived
equality of these manipulations depends on the assumption that auditors make fraud risk assessments under what
Kahneman (2011) calls “System 1” thinking, which is experience- and emotion-based, automatic, and quick, not
under “System 2” thinking, which is slower and effortful, supporting logical calculations. The fact that a percentage
change in a payoff to the organization would potentially impact multiple stakeholders, but the same percentage
change applied directly to a manager would only impact one or a few managers, means that any such perceived
inequality in the manipulation would work against the direction of the hypothesized experimental group
relationships.
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Figure 6: Treatment for Low Compensation Alignment with Payoffs to the Organization

Figure 7: Treatment for High Compensation Alignment with Payoffs to the Organization
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By comparison, groups E and F receive the Figure 7 alternative treatment, highly aligned
compensation, which is characterized by top managers with 30% fixed compensation and 70%
variable compensation from bonus, stock and option grants. Additionally, managers in the highly
aligned compensation condition own stock and options valued at more than 13 times total annual
compensation. Since the value of the stock and option portfolio is dependent on company
earnings, this variable compensation structure, including relatively large stock and options
ownership, make the compensation performance payoffs to top managers highly aligned with the
financial statement earnings payoffs to the organization, because earnings growth increases the
value of the stock and options, which increases top manager income and wealth.
The minimally aligned and the highly aligned compensation conditions25 both reflect
total annual compensation for the top five executives of $3.5 million, but the minimally aligned
condition is comprised primarily of fixed compensation, while the highly aligned condition
primarily reflects variable compensation dependent on organizational earnings levels.
The compensation alignment experimental factor is especially of interest when
considered in combination with auditor assessment of organizationally focused FRFs. Although a
full 2 x 2 x 2 interaction of the three experimental factors (FRF focus, FRF type and
compensation alignment) would result in eight experimental groups, two of these groups are not
needed to answer the research questions and hypotheses. Interest in the research questions of this

25

The compensation manipulation amounts are based on the actual relative compensation amounts of the top five
managers on which the case was based, adjusted for the two manipulated conditions based on cash and non-cash
compensation from a large sample of ExecuComp data analyzed in Core et al. (2003, p. 965). The minimally aligned
compensation condition is based on the relatively higher cash pay level of the upper quartile for CEO compensation,
plus the relatively lower stock and option grant and ownership level of the lower quartile for CEO non-cash
compensation. The highly aligned compensation condition is based on the relatively lower cash compensation level
of the lower quartile for CEO pay, plus the relatively higher stock and option grant and ownership level of the upper
quartile for CEO non-cash compensation. While these two conditions could have been created using hypothetical
assumptions, the approach based on Core et al. (2003) provides some generalizability for the two experimental
conditions created.
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study results in consideration of two additional experimental groups E and F, resulting in six
total experimental groups:







Group A) Incentive for a potential gain to the organization (low compensation alignment)
Group B) Pressure of a potential loss to the organization (low compensation alignment)
Group C) Incentive for a potential gain to individual top managers (low compensation alignment)
Group D) Pressure for a potential loss to individual top managers (low compensation alignment)
Group E) Incentive for a potential gain to the organization (high compensation alignment)
Group F) Pressure of a potential loss to the organization (high compensation alignment)

5.5 Auditor Judgment Dependent Variable and Covariates
During the experiment each participant assesses fraud risk factors on the opportunities
work paper, the attitude/rationalization work paper and the fraud motivation work paper, using a
scale from 1 (low risk) to 10 (high risk). The risk assessment for each individual risk factor
represented by bubbles labeled “1” to “10” in the instrument is not a variable in the study, but
rather, represents additional information in the case, and the participant risk assessment of each
fraud risk factor maximizes attention to these case facts. The participant’s overall motivation-forfraud risk assessment made on the incentive/pressure work paper is the dependent variable of
interest used to compare auditor judgment under alternative fraud risk factor framings. The
overall opportunity-for-fraud risk assessment and overall attitude/rationalization-for-fraud risk
assessment represent potential covariates for analysis. The opportunity risk (set as high risk for
all participants) and the attitude/rationalization risk (set as low risk for all participants), together
should frame a range of responses to risk, resulting in a more consistent measure for each
participant for the next risk assessment made in the experiment, the one for the dependent
variable, risk assessment for overall fraud motivation. Risk assessment variables for opportunity
and for attitude/rationalization are candidates for ANCOVA model covariates, to account for
variance attributed solely to differences in participant risk scale calibration.
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5.6 Auditor Decision Dependent Variables
One common research question explored in auditing literature is: “Will auditors make
audit planning decisions that are responsive to their risk assessments?” (Pincus 1989; Zimbelman
1997; Wright and Bedard 2000; Johnstone and Bedard 2001; Bedard and Graham 2002; Glover
et al. 2003; Asare and Wright 2004; Wilkes and Zimbelman 2004; Mock and Turner 2005;
Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009; Hammersley 2011; and Favere-Marchesi 2013). These studies
find mixed evidence of auditor responsiveness to risk assessments under various conditions, and
some find limited or no responsiveness to risk assessments (Zimbelman 1997; Wright and
Bedard 2000; Johnstone and Bedard 2001; Glover et al. 2003; and Asare and Wright 2004;
Wilkes and Zimbelman 2004). Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) believe that they detect more
risk-responsive audit decisions in an experiment by providing a more specific case context for
audit decisions. Procedures based on this experiment by Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) were
used in this current experiment to measure and compare audit decision-making by participants.
This portion of the instrument consists of a series of audit parameters planned for audit of
accounts receivable and revenue in the case. These parameters include:









Number of positive accounts receivable confirmations to distributors
Percentage of positive accounts receivable confirmations to distributors as a percent of
total confirmations
Difference in the percentage of subsequent cash receipts examined for accounts
receivable from distributors, less those from non-distributors
Number of days past year-end to examine subsequent cash receipts
Number of days past year-end to examine sales returns
Hours budgeted for computer automated audit techniques or forensic accounting
procedures
Hours budgeted to conduct interviews of client personnel about sales and accounts
receivable
Hours budgeted for all sales/accounts receivable audit procedures
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Each of these parameters is a dependent variable for analysis of auditor decision making in
hypotheses 1b and 2b. Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) developed these dependent variables by
consulting with three national fraud expert partners from three different international public
accounting firms about benchmark planning decisions that would be effective procedures for
detecting the fraud in this case. Each audit parameter used for the hypothetical prior year audit of
the company is revealed, and participants are asked to make an independent decision for each
parameter for the current year audit, considering their risk assessments and other facts from the
case. Consistent with Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009), this experiment anticipates that auditors
tend to use the heuristic of defaulting to last year’s audit plan (Bedard 1989), so a change in the
current year audit parameter value represents a modification to the nature, timing or extent of
testing by the auditor. The following excerpts from Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) explain the
reasoning behind use of these auditor decision variables in their experiment, as adopted in this
dissertation research.
Accounts Receivable Confirmations
Our experts recommend that it is far more effective to send positive rather than
negative confirmations and, because fraud is in the distributor accounts, the
confirmations should focus on these accounts. Our dependent measures to test for these
recommendations are (1) the number of positive confirmations to distributors and (2) the
percentage of positive confirmations to distributors of total confirmations. Since the
fraud involves sales and accounts receivable within a subset of customers (i.e.,
distributors), we test whether our groups vary the nature of their confirmation evidence
by focusing their confirmations on distributors. Thus, auditors who emphasize positive
confirmations to distributors, as opposed to just sending more confirmations overall,
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effectively vary the nature of their confirmation evidence to detect suspected fraud. We
use two measures to capture these recommendations because the number of positive
confirmations to distributors could increase if there is an increase in the extent of testing
(e.g., sending more confirmations overall without focusing on distributor accounts). Also,
the percentage of positive confirmations to distributors of total confirmations could
increase for reasons that are not part of the experts’ recommendations (e.g., a decrease
in other confirmations rather than an increase in positive confirmations to distributors).
Thus, these two measures test whether the auditors change the nature of their procedures
as the experts recommend.26
Subsequent Cash Receipts and Sales Returns
The experts recommend that the auditor extends the periods for examining
subsequent cash receipts and sales returns after year-end. For each of these items, we
inform participants that last year the period examined was from January 1st to February
15th and ask them for the period they want to examine this year.27As a result, we have two
separate dependent measures that involve the number of days past year-end: one for
subsequent cash receipts and one for sales returns. . . . On the other hand, if the auditor
is concerned that distributors will be slower to pay for “channel stuffed” sales and/or
return the sales after a relatively long time period because of a side agreement, the
auditor would change the window for examining both cash receipts and sales returns28.
Our experts also recommend that the audit plan should focus the review of
subsequent cash receipts on the distributor cash balances as opposed to the other
26

Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009, p. 827)
For the current study, the prior year subsequent receipts period is abbreviated to “45 days used last year.”
28
Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009, p. 827)
27

54

account balances. We ask participants, “What percentage of the A/R balances from
distributors do you want to examine subsequent cash receipts for this year?” We also ask
for the corresponding percentage for the other accounts. We use the difference in the
percentages as our dependent measure. This variable captures the type of customer (i.e.
distributor or other) participants plan to focus on in their subsequent cash receipts
tests.29
Other Auditing Procedures
Our experts suggest that participants should use other procedures, such as interviews
of client personnel and Computer Assisted Audit Techniques (CAATs), to determine
unusual relationships and items such as fictitious addresses on confirmations. Our
dependent measures for these two recommendations are the number of hour budgeted to
perform the interviews or the CAATs. Note that last year zero hours were budgeted for
each of these procedures, so if auditors budget any hours for these procedures, they are
changing the nature of the audit plan. Of course, they are also changing the extent of
their testing by budgeting more hours.30
5.7 Experimental Procedures
In Part I of the case participants are asked to assume the role of an audit manager newly
assigned to an audit of the company. After reading the company background, all participants are
asked to assess fraud risk related to three risk assessment work papers for opportunities for fraud,
attitudes/rationalization for fraud, and incentives/pressure (motivation) for fraud, which risks
were previously identified as being present at the company by their staff assigned to the audit
29
30

Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009, pp. 827, 828)
Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009, p. 828)
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engagement. Information is also presented about the degree of compensation alignment between
payoffs to top managers relative to earnings payoffs to the organization. These fraud risk
assessments are being made during audit planning, prior to client year-end. Then an overall fraud
risk assessment is made. In Part II of the case, information from analytical procedures and
management explanations for growth in sales and accounts receivable are provided. Then the
values for prior year audit procedures are revealed (such as number of confirmations to send and
days past year-end to review subsequent receipts and returns), and participants are asked to make
a series of decisions about audit parameters to use in the current year audit, while striving to
achieve both efficiency and effectiveness. Lastly, demographic questions and manipulation
check questions are asked of the participants.
5.8 Planned Contrasts Analysis
Hypothesis 1 predicts that when fraud risk factors are focused on top managers, mean
dependent variable values will exceed those when fraud risk factors are focused on the
organization. Hypothesis 2 predicts that when fraud risk factors are framed as a pressure of a
loss, mean dependent variables will exceed those measured when fraud risk factors are framed as
an incentive for a gain. Hypothesis 3 predicts that an ordinal interaction will occur such that
dependent variables for pressure of a loss will be relatively greater than those for incentive for a
gain, when fraud risk factors are focused on top managers, rather than on the organization. If
these hypotheses hold true, group D means will exceed those of A, B and C. Whether group C
means will exceed group A means is not predicted, but will be tested. These expected
relationships between group means are illustrated in Figure 8.
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D
Dependent
Variables

Top Manager Focus

C
Organizational Focus
A

B

Incentive
for Gain

Pressure
of Loss

Figure 8: Predicted Group Relationships from Hypotheses 1a
The second set of hypotheses predicts that auditors will not incorporate their knowledge
of a highly aligned executive compensation structure into the fraud risk assessment process. In
H2a dependent variable measures for cells E and F are predicted to be equal to those of cells A
and B. This expected relationship is depicted in Figure 9. The compensation condition for groups
A, B, C and D in Figures 8 and 9 is minimal alignment between payoffs to top managers and to
the organization and its shareholders. Management compensation for these groups is primarily
fixed and change in stock price will have a minimal impact on top manager compensation and
wealth from stock and option holdings of top managers. The compensation condition for groups
E and F in Figure 9 is high alignment between payoffs to top managers and to the organization
and its shareholders. Management compensation for these groups is primarily variable, and
changes in stock price will have a valuation effect on stock and options holdings of top
managers. Under the high alignment effect of the group E and F conditions, auditors should have
similar fraud risk assessments as when fraud risk factors are focused directly on top managers.
However, Hypothesis 2a predicts that fraud risk assessments for high compensation alignment
groups E and F will be equal to those of low compensation alignment groups A and B.
Hypothesis 2b predicts that the extent of auditor decisions for high compensation alignment
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groups E and F will be equal to those of low compensation alignment groups A and B, and not
equal to those of groups C and D.
D
Dependent
Variables

Top Manager Focus (Low Compensation Alignment)

C
E
A

F
B

Organizational Focus (High Compensation Alignment)
Organizational Focus (Low Compensation Alignment)

Incentive
Pressure
for Gain
of Loss
Figure 9: Predicted Group Relationships from Hypothesis 2a

Buckless and Ravenscroft (1990) describe that contrast coding—a refinement of
ANOVA—is a more powerful test than traditional ANOVA for detecting this type of ordinal
interaction depicted in Figures 8 and 9. The increased power of contrast coding decreases the
likelihood of incorrectly finding non-hypothesized effects, strengthens the probability of
detecting hypothesized effects when they exist, and avoids increasing the likelihood of Type I
errors (Buckless and Ravenscroft, 1990). Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) employ contrast
coding to analyze expected ordinal interactions similar to the ones predicted in this current
experiment.
Hypotheses comparison of group means for auditor risk assessments will be examined
using ANCOVA, contrast coding and limited t-tests for differences in group means. Given the
ordinal interactions predicted, the expectation that group D means will exceed those of groups A,
B and C, is tested with separate contrast weight tests: -1, -1, -1, 3; -1, -1, 2, 0; and -1, 1, 0, 0 for
groups A, B, C, D, respectively. These tests will reveal any ordinal differences between group
means that exist.
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The multiple dependent variables collected for different audit planning decisions tested in
H1b are described in the “Auditing Decision Dependent Variables” section above. Given the
ordinal interactions predicted, the expectation that group D means will exceed those of groups A,
B and C, is tested with contrast weight tests described above for groups A, B, C, D, respectively.
When no evidence exists for interaction effects for auditor decision dependent variables, main
effects will be tested.
The dependent variables used in H1b and H2b are the same auditor decision dependent
variables used by Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009). Significant group differences in every
dependent variable are not required in order to demonstrate the auditor response to risk, as some
audit procedures could be performed as alternatives to others, depending on the judgment of the
auditor. Audit procedures corroborating the existence of accounts receivable can include a
variety of audit procedures, including third party confirmation, the use of a specialist, analytical
procedures, examination of documentation from independent sources (such as subsequent
collections), or inquiries of others within or outside the entity (AICPA 2002, AU 316.46). The
greater the number of dependent variable audit procedures modified by auditor participants, the
more extensive is the auditor response to fraud risk posed in the case.
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6. RESULTS
Before discussing results from tests of hypotheses, participant reaction to the case and
manipulation checks are presented. All participant groups correctly perceive the case to be a
relatively high fraud risk case. The mean risk assessment for total fraud risk for the six treatment
groups range from 7.2 to 7.7 on a ten-point scale, 10 being the greatest risk of fraud. There were
no significant differences in the mean assessment of overall fraud risk between treatment groups
(Global F-statistic = .434, p-value = .824).31
6.1 Manipulation Checks
Manipulation check questions were asked of participants after all other experimental
responses were collected. Eighty-four percent of participants recall whether the motivation-forfraud risk factors they assess are focused on top managers or on the company. Eighty-eight
percent of participants recall whether the motivation-for-fraud risk factor outcomes they assess
are potential rewards for goals achieved (incentives for gains) or potential penalties for goals not
achieved (pressure of loss). Ninety-three percent of participants recall whether the management
compensation structure is primarily fixed, with stock and option ownership equal to less than one
times cash salary, or primarily variable with stock and option ownership exceeding 13 times

31

Although there is not a significant difference between groups for overall risk assessed, there are significant
differences between groups reflected in hypothesis testing for motivation-for-fraud risk assessments and audit
decisions. Supplemental analysis reflect that many participants tend to average their risk assessments for their three
fraud triangle risk assessments (opportunity, attitude/rationalization, and incentive/pressure/motivation), when
determining their overall risk assessment. This averaging effect makes overall risk assessments by participants from
different groups more similar, even though there are significant differences between group motivation-for-fraud risk
assessments, primarily for Group D, which observes pressure on top manager fraud risk factors.
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annual cash salary. Significance of results is not different when eliminating participants who fail
manipulation checks. For purposes of analysis, all participant data are reflected in results.
6.2 Significance Criteria and Data Assumptions
An alpha of p = .05 is used for tests of significance for tests performed. Each
experimental group dependent variable is tested for the equality of variance ANOVA assumption
using Levene’s test, and is tested for a normality of distribution assumption using visual
inspection of the frequency distributions of dependent variable measures for each group.
Levene’s tests provide evidence supporting the equality of variance assumption for the auditor
judgment dependent variable and for some, but not all, of the auditor decision dependent
variables. The p-values in tests are adjusted to account for unequal variances of the dependent
variable across groups, when necessary. The visual inspections of dependent variable
distributions appear normal, except that the distributions appear to be non-normal for three
dependent variables reflecting budgeted audit hours. No conclusions are based on significant
findings utilizing these three budgeted hour dependent variables.
6.3 Tests of Auditor Judgment Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1a predicts that when considering financial statement fraud risks, auditor
assessment of motivation-for-fraud risk will be greatest when focused on factors for pressure of a
loss for top managers, rather than on incentives or organizational factors. Table 4, Panel A
reflects the greatest mean risk assessment (8.7, 95% CI: [8.2, 9.2]) for pressure of loss on top
managers, which is greater than the mean assessment for incentive for gain to top managers (8.0,
95% CI: [7.4, 8.5]) or for assessments for organizationally focused factors (7.7, 95% CI: [6.9,
8.6]). Figure 10 plots these relationships.
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Figure 10: Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments under Low Compensation Alignment

Although the ANCOVA model in Table 4, Panel B is significant (Global F-statistic =
6.443, p-value = 0.000), the interaction of fraud motivation type and fraud risk factor focus was
not significant. Buckless & Ravenscroft (1990) state that ANOVA models (and therefore,
ANCOVA models) are less powerful as a statistical tool for testing ordinal interactions and that
contrast coding—a refinement of ANOVA—has increased power for testing ordinal interactions.
An ordinal interaction is the type predicted in this study, as reflected in Figure 10. Therefore,
planned contrast test weights of -1, -1, -1, 3 for groups A, B, C and D, respectively are used to
test whether the mean risk assessment for group D is significantly greater than the mean for A,
B, and C. The mean for group D is significantly greater (p < .008, one-tailed). Next, planned
contrast test weights of -1, -1, 2, 0 for groups A, B, C and D, respectively are used to test
whether the mean risk assessment for group C is greater than those of groups A and B. The mean
risk assessment for group C is not significantly greater than for groups A or B (p < .253, onetailed). Lastly, planned contrast weights of -1, 1, 0, 0 for groups A, B, C and D, respectively are
used to test whether the mean risk assessment for group B is significantly greater than for group
A. The mean risk assessment for group B is not significantly greater than for group A (p< .483,
one tailed). Together, these tests support Hypothesis 1a, which predicts that auditors will assess
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greater motivation-for-fraud risks for factors framed as a pressure of a loss, rather than incentive
for a gain, but only when fraud risk factors are focused on individual top managers, rather than
on the organization.
Table 4: Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments
Panel A: Descriptive statistics mean (Standard Deviation) for Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments on a Scale: 1(Low Risk)
to 10 (High Risk)
Incentive
Pressure
for a Gain
of a Loss
Row Mean
FRF focused on the organization,
Group A
Group B
(given low compensation alignment between
(n = 24)
(n = 22)
(n = 46)
payoffs to the organization and to top executives)
7.7
7.7
7.7
(1.5)
(1.9)
(1.7)
FRF focused on top managers,
(given low compensation alignment between
payoffs to the organization and to top executives)

Group C
(n = 22)
8.0
(1.2)

Group D
(n = 21)
8.7
(1.1)

(n = 43)
8.3
(1.2)

Column Mean

(n = 46)
7.8
(1.4)

(n = 43)
8.2
(1.6)

(n = 89)
8.0
(1.5)

Panel B: Results of ANCOVA with the Dependent Variable for Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments
Source of Variation
Corrected Model
Focus (Organizational or Individual) (a)
Motivation Frame (Incentive or Pressure) (b)
Focus x Motivation Frame
Fraud Opportunity (c)
Fraud Attitude/Rationalization (d)
Error

df
5
1
1
1
1
1
83

SS
57.100
15.927
1.370
2.031
18.847
13.538
147.125

MS
11.420
15.927
1.370
2.031
18.847
13.538
1.773

F-Statistic
6.443
8.985
.773
1.146
10.633
7.637

p-value
0.000
0.004
0.382
0.288
0.002
0.007

Panel C: Planned Contrast on Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments

Source of Variation
Contrast Weights are -1, -1, -1, 3 (e)
Contrast Weights are -1, -1, +2, 0 (e)
Contrast Weights are -1, +1, 0, 0 (e)

Value of
Contrast
2.730
0.519
0.019

df
85
85
85

Standard
Error
1.120
0.775
0.441

t-statistic
2.439
0.670
0.043

p-value
(one-tailed)
0.009 H1a
0.253
0.483

(a) Fraud risk factor treatments for organizational focus (Group A and Group B) are coded as 0, and for individual focus (Group C and Group D) are coded as 1.
(b) Fraud risk factor for incentive treatment (Group A and Group C) are coded as 0, and for pressure treatment (Group B and Group D) are coded as 1.
(c) Based on participants' rating of fraud risk reflected on the Opportunities risk work paper, on a scale from 1(low risk) to 10 (high risk).
(d) Based on participants' rating of fraud risks reflected on the Attitude/Rationalization risks work paper, on a scale from 1(low risk) to 10 (high risk).
(e) Contrast weights represent coefficient weights for planned contrasts in the dependent variable between the four treatment groups (A, B, C and D) in
the ANOVA.
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Hypothesis 2a suggests that a high alignment of top management compensation, linking
payoffs of top managers with payoffs to the organization, would not be incorporated into auditor
risk assessments, although compensation should be a consideration in the auditor risk assessment
process (PCAOB, AS No. 12, 2010; AS No. 14, 2010; AS No. 18, 2014.) H2a predicts that when
performance payoffs to top managers are highly aligned with financial statement payoffs to the
Table 5: Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments-High v. Low Compensation Alignment
Panel A: Descriptive statistics mean (Standard Deviation) for Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments on a Scale: 1(Low Risk)
to 10 (High Risk) for Low Compensation Alignment versus High Compensation Alignment
Incentive
for a Gain
Group A
(n = 24)
7.7
(1.5)

Pressure
of a Loss
Group B
(n = 22)
7.7
(1.9)

FRF focused on the organization,
given high compensation alignment between
payoffs to the organization and to top executives

Group E
(n = 22)
7.5
(1.7)

Group F
(n = 20)
8.2
(1.2)

(n = 42)
7.8
(1.5)

Column Mean

(n = 46)
7.6
(1.6)

(n = 42)
7.9
(1.6)

(n = 88)
7.8
(1.6)

FRF focused on the organization,
given low compensation alignment between
payoffs to the organization and to top executives

Row Mean
(n = 46)
7.7
(1.7)

Panel B: Descriptive statistics mean (Standard Deviation) for Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments on a Scale: 1(Low Risk)
to 10 (High Risk) for Top Manager Focus versus High Compensation Alignment Treatment
Incentive
for a Gain
Group C
(n = 22)
8.0
(1.2)

Pressure
of a Loss
Group D
(n = 21)
8.7
(1.1)

FRF focused on the organization,
given high compensation alignment between
payoffs to the organization and to top executives

Group E
(n = 22)
7.5
(1.7)

Group F
(n = 20)
8.2
(1.2)

(n = 42)
7.8
(1.5)

Column Mean

(n = 44)
7.7
(1.5)

(n = 41)
8.4
(1.2)

(n = 85)
8.1
(1.4)

FRF focused on top managers,
(given low compensation alignment between
payoffs to the organization and to top executives)

Row Mean
(n = 43)
8.3
(1.2)

organization managed, auditors will assess motivation-for-fraud risk as being no different than
when performance payoffs to top managers are minimally aligned with payoffs to the
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organization. The highly aligned compensation structure in this experiment, if incorporated into
auditor assessment of organizational risks, ideally, should result in a focus directly on incentive
for gain or pressure of loss for top executives (equal to the experimental conditions for groups C
and D). Testing H2a is accomplished by comparing mean motivation-for-fraud risk assessments
for groups E and F (high compensation alignment) to those of groups A and B (low
compensation alignment) to support or refute the prediction of no significant difference. The
relationship between the six group means is illustrated in Figure 11. If the group A, B, C and D
means are not significantly different, then H2a is supported. However, if the group F mean is
significantly greater than the group B mean, an interaction relationship is demonstrated such that
a difference between pressure of loss risk assessments depends on whether there is high or low
compensation alignment, which would evidence against H2a.
Since H2a represents a null hypothesis, power analysis was performed before interpreting
test results. The most powerful test in this experimental setting for determining whether there is
no significant difference in risk assessments between the minimal or maximal compensation
alignment conditions is a t-test of whether group F exceeds group B mean risk assessments. A
power table from Cohen (1988) reflects that the sample sizes of 22 and 20 attained for groups B
and F, respectively, result in a 46 to 50 percent chance of detecting a medium effect size if it
exists. This means there is an approximately 50% chance of a Type II error, predicting no
compensation alignment effect when one actually exists. Based on this power test, an
insignificant difference between the group F and group B means would be inconclusive.
However, a significantly greater group F mean relative to the group B mean would constitute
evidence against H2b. The mean for group F is not significantly different from the mean for
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group B (t = .837, p = .408, two tailed), but since there is insufficient power to test this null
hypothesis this is inconclusive evidence. H2a is therefore not supported.
Figure 11 reflects the plot of group means from Table 5 for each of the six participant
groups.

8.7
Mean
Risk
Assessments

8.0
7.7
7.5
Incentive
for Gain

Top Manager Focus (Low Compensation Alignment)
Organizational Focus (High Compensation Alignment)

8.2
7.7

Organizational Focus (Low Compensation Alignment)

Pressure
of Loss

Figure 11: Motivation-for-Fraud Risk Assessments under All Six Conditions32
6.4 Tests of Auditor Decision Hypotheses
Table 6 presents eight separate audit decisions made by auditors in this experiment. The
participants were asked to consider their fraud risk assessments and other facts observed in the
company case, and to designate the level of these audit planning decisions. Together, these
decisions represent the nature, timing, and extent of the accounts receivable audit planned by
participants. Based on the panel of experts consulted by Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009),
increases in each of these audit steps represent opportunities for the auditor to make audit
planning decisions that are responsive to the risks presented in this case, which is adapted from
Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009). In this study, H1b suggests that auditors considering pressure
32

When participants who failed the manipulation check question for degree of compensation alignment are
eliminated from the analysis, the mean fraud risk assessments for high compensation alignment are equal (7.8 on a
ten scale) for both the incentive and pressure conditions. This supports a conclusion that participants who best
understood the compensation alignment manipulation did not differentiate between the incentive and pressure
conditions when fraud risk factors were focused on the organization.
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on top manager risk factors will make greater risk-responsive audit planning decisions than
auditors considering incentive to top manager risk factors or organizationally focused risk
factors. The hypothesis development section of this paper suggests that auditors considering risk
factors focused on the perspective of individual top managers will make greater risk responsive
audit planning decisions than auditors considering risk factors focused on the perspective of the
organization. This hypothesis development also suggests that auditors considering risk factors
framed as pressure of a loss will make greater risk responsive audit planning decisions than
auditors considering risk factors framed as an incentive for a gain. To the extent that the H1b
interaction hypothesis is supported for each audit decision, that interaction decision dominates
and the underlying main effects hypotheses will not be interpreted. However, when the
interaction hypothesis is not supported for each audit decision, then the main effects will also be
tested and interpreted.
Audit procedures corroborating the existence of accounts receivable can include a variety
of procedures (AICPA 2002, AU 316.46), and some procedures may be used as alternatives to
others (AICPA 1991, AU 330.32). The greater the number of audit decision hypotheses
supported in Table 6, the stronger is the evidence of auditor risk responsive audit decisions.
However, any evidence of increased auditor response to conditions should be initially evaluated
as support for H1b, and if not supporting H1b, as support for main effects for fraud risk factor
motivation type (incentive or pressure) and for main effects for fraud risk factor focus.
Table 6 reflects that there is evidence of risk-responsive audit decisions made by auditors,
but the evidence is mixed. Results for one audit decisions is consistent with H1b, two audit
decisions are consistent with main effects for fraud risk factor motivation type (incentive or
pressure) and two audit decisions are consistent with main effects for fraud risk factor focus
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(company or top manager). Table 6 presents the mean decision measure for the eight different
audit planning decisions made by participants in each of the initial four treatment groups exposed
to various motivation-for-fraud risk factors, varied for focus (organization or top manager) and
motivation type (incentive for a gain or pressure of a loss). Consistent with the analysis of
auditor risk assessments, contrast coding within an ANOVA model is used to detect ordinal
interactions between groups for auditor decisions. Also contrast coding is used to test for main
effects for audit decisions.
Because there are multiple dependent variables to be tested, steps should be taken to
minimize the risk of Type I error that could result from multiple tests. One approach would be to
conduct a MANCOVA model for all dependent variables, and if the model is significant, conduct
univariate ANCOVAs for each dependent variable, and then limit post hoc tests to only those
dependent variables having a significant univariate ANCOVA result. However, the MANCOVA
reliability is unclear due to inequality of covariance matrices and the mixed results of the
ANCOVA global F-tests.33 The need to run a MANCOVA model is reduced by the fact that
dependent variables are not highly correlated, with one exception.34 Using these same dependent
variables in a similar test of auditor decisions, Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) elect not to use a
MANOVA test due to large variances between groups, and instead elect to use contrast coding,
where t-test p-values can be individually adjusted for equal or unequal variances on a dependent
variable specific basis. The statistical testing in this paper is conducted in the same manner for
the H1b and H2b hypotheses.

33

The Global F-test of significance of the MANCOVA model is as follows: Pillai’s Trace = .100; Wilks’ Lambda =
.102; Hotelling’s Trace = .105; Roy’s Largest Root = .010.
34
The bivariate correlations between all independent variables are low except for the two variables—days
subsequent receipts examined and days subsequent returns examined, which have a correlation of .854.
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The case scenario provides participants with seeded risks for accounts receivable and
revenue recognition fraud, achieved through channel stuffing to distributors. Table 6 reflects that
auditors who observed fraud risk factors indicating pressure on top managers (group D), send a
greater mean percentage (52 percent) of accounts receivable confirmations to distributors, a
proportion greater than those sent by auditors who observed incentives on top managers (group
C, 46 percent) or who observed organizationally focused risk factors (groups A and B, 46
percent each) (t = 2.392, p = .019, one tailed). Also, a one-way ANOVA comparison of means
between groups A, B and C reveals no differences between those three group means (F-statistic
= .920, p-value = .404). Together, these tests support Hypothesis H1b for the percentage of
positive confirmations to distributors dependent variable. Group D participants that observed
pressure on top managers requested the highest percentage of positive confirmations to be sent to
distributors. Since no other tests of audit decisions for pressure on top managers is significant,
tests for main effects for fraud risk factor focus and motivation type are next conducted.
Main effects for fraud risk factor focus would suggest that auditors considering financial
statement fraud risks framed from the perspective of individual top managers will make more
extensive risk-responsive audit planning decisions than when considering those framed from the
perspective of the organization. Table 6 reflects two audit decisions that are consistent with these
main effects. The mean number of days past year-end to examine subsequent cash receipts for
collection of accounts receivable is 59.1 days under fraud risk factors focused on top managers,
and 52.9 days under fraud risk factors focused on the organization, a significant difference (t =
2.152, p = .017, one tailed test). The mean number of days past year-end to examine sales returns
is 58.0 days under FRFs focused on top managers, and 52.2 days under FRFs focused on the
organization, a significant difference (p = .020, one tailed test). No other test for audit decisions
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focused on top managers exceeding those focused on the organization in six other audit planning
questions is significant.
Main effects for fraud risk factor motivation type (incentive or pressure) predicts that
auditors considering financial statement fraud risks framed as a pressure of a loss will make
more extensive risk-responsive audit planning decisions than when considering those framed as
incentive for a potential gain. Table 6 reflects two audit decisions that are consistent with main
effects for fraud risk factor motivation type (incentive or pressure). The mean percentage of
positive accounts receivable confirmations sent to distributors is 50% under FRFs focused on
pressures of a loss, and 46% under FRFs focused on incentive for a gain, a significant difference
(t = 2.552, p = .007, one tailed test). Another audit decision, the difference in the percentage of
subsequent cash receipts examined from accounts receivable from distributors, less that from
non-distributors in the case is 2.4 percent under pressure of a loss FRFs, and .7 percent under
incentive for gain fraud risk factors, a significant difference (t = 1.815, p = .038). No other test
for risk-responsive audit planning decisions for pressure of loss exceeding those under incentive
for gain in six other audit planning questions is significant.
Table 6 results follow a pattern. The significant differences in audit decisions observed
between incentive and pressure factors were associated with audit decisions specific to
distributors, where the channel stuffing fraud risk was indicated in the case. The significant
differences in audit decisions observed between company-focused versus top manager-focused
factors were associated with more general audit procedures for sales returns and subsequent
collections that did not differentiate between distributors and other customers.
Taken together, the audit decisions reflected in Table 6 represent the nature, timing and
extent of testing planned by auditors. Auditing standards require the auditor to perform further
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procedures

110.1
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(6.3)

15.2
(13.3)

52.3
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52.3
(12.3)

2.4
(5.2)

(.06)

49%

56
(37)

126.7
(28.0)

6.9
(5.1)

17.7
(21.9)

58.5
(11.9)

59.1
(14.0)

1.7
(4.4)

(.08)

46%
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111.0
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(4.5)

12.0
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(.09)
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(b)

-1.992
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H1b

2.392*

(n.s.)

D > A,B&C
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6.1
(5.4)
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(13.9)

52.9
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119.4
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5.7
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(.09)
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(3.3)
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46%

46
(27)

110.5
(24.4)

5.4
(5.5)

13.7
(15.8)

54.8
(13.1)

55.5
(13.3)

2.4
(5.0)

(.05)

50%

55
(31)
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2.092*
main effects

2.152*
main effects
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-2.20
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1.815*
main effects

main effects

2.552*
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n = 44/45/46 n = 42 or 43 n = 45/46/47 n = 41 or 42

Groups A&B

Main Effects
______Focus______
Motivation Type
Company Top Mgr. Incentive Pressure

n.s. Non-significant results for the test.

* This test is significant for the difference predicted, using a an alpha of .05 in a directional one-tailed test.

(d) ANOVA contrast weights assigned are -1, 1, -1, 1, the equivalent of a t-test for differences in mean audit decision measures between Groups A and C versus Groups B and D [main effect for fraud motivation type (incentive or pressure)].

(c) ANOVA contrast weights assigned are -1, -1, 1, 1, the equivalent of a t-test for differences in mean audit decision measures between Groups A and B versuses Group C and D [main effect for fraud risk factor focus (organization or top managers)].

(b) ANOVA contrast weights assigned are -1, -1, -1, 3, the equivalent of a t-test for differences between Group D and Groups A, B and C (interaction effect).

(a) Each audit procedure is a different dependent variable collected from an an experimental instrument where participants budget audit procedure hours and other auditing parameters, after considering their own fraud risk assessments made in the case.
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(4.6)

Hours budgeted to conduct interviews of client
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53.5
(13.6)

Number of days past year-end to
examine subsequent cash receipts

10.3
(8.0)

-.2
(1.0)
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for A/R from dist. less from non-dist.

Hours budgeted for computer automated audit
techniques or forensic accounting procedures

(.07)

distributors (% of total confirmations)

52.0
(14.2)

46%

Percentage of positive confirmations to

Number of days past year-end to
examine sales returns

49
(35)

n = 23 or24 n = 21or 22 n = 22 or23

Group A

Organizational Focus Top Manager Focus
Incentive Pressure Incentive Pressure

Number of positive confirmations to distributors

Dependent Variables: Budgeted Audit Procedures (a)

Mean (Standard Deviation)

Table 6: Mean, (Standard Deviation), and Group Comparison Audit Decisions

audit procedures whose nature, timing and extent will be responsive to fraud risks assessed
(AICPA 2006, AU 318.07). The significantly greater percentage of positive confirmations to
distributors planned by auditors observing a pressure on top managers represents a risk
responsive change in the nature of audit procedures. The significantly greater percent of
subsequent cash receipts observed for distributors versus nondistributors, as planned by auditors
observing a pressure of a loss, rather than incentive for a gain, also represents a risk responsive
change in the nature of audit procedures. The significant increase in the number of days to
observe subsequent receipts and sales returns selected by auditors observing risk factors focused
on top managers, rather than on the company, represents a risk responsive increase in the
timing and extent of testing.
Since multiple tests of multiple dependent variables have been made, a Type I error risk
exists that some significant results may be detected only by chance. However, these results are of
interest because even a single auditor decision leading to the acquisition of additional audit
evidence improves auditors’ ability to recognize additional risk, which in turn, should lead to the
acquisition of even more audit evidence. Auditors are permitted to rely on alternative tests to
achieve the same audit objective for accounts receivable (AICPA 1991, AU 330.32). Accounts
receivable confirmations, examination of subsequent collections and examination of sales returns
represent procedures that may be used as alternative or complementary procedures to reach an
audit objective, depending on the professional judgment of the auditor.
6.5 Tests of Auditor Decisions under Two Alternate Compensation Schemes
The results of tests for H2b are inconclusive overall, so H2b is not supported. Hypothesis
2b predicts that when performance payoffs to top managers are highly aligned with financial
statement payoffs to the organization managed, auditors will make audit planning decisions that
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are no different than when performance payoffs to top managers are minimally aligned with
payoffs to the organization managed. Results of initial tests tend to support H2b, but are not
conclusive. Three audit procedures for which significant differences were found in other
hypotheses35 have insignificant differences between the two compensation alignment treatments
in this hypothesis, which is consistent with H2b. However, two audit planning decisions are
marginally more extensive when compensation alignment is high. The mean number of days
selected for examination of sales returns was 58.3 days in the high alignment condition and 52.2
days in the minimal alignment condition, a difference that is marginally significant using the
non-directional test of the hypothesis (t-value = 1.854, p-value = .067, two tailed test). The
difference in the percentage of subsequent cash receipts examined from accounts receivable from
distributors, less that from non-distributors in the case is 3.6 percent in the high alignment
condition and 1.0 percent in the minimal alignment condition, a difference that is marginally
significant using the non-directional test of the hypothesis (t-value = 1.697, p = .094, two tailed
test).
While three tests show no significant difference between high and minimal compensation
alignment, as predicted, the last two tests show that high compensation alignment resulted in
marginally different and greater risk responsive audit decisions. Also, the results of power
analysis previously described prevent reliance on interpretation of null hypothesis results. A
supplemental comparison regarding group F and group D was performed. If group D audit
dependent variables were significantly greater than those of group F, that fact would provide
supplemental evidence that fraud risk factors focus on top managers were a greater determinant

35

Significant differences in decisions were found for the percentage of positive confirmations sent to distributors,
for the difference in percentage of subsequent cash receipts examined, and for the number of days subsequent
receipts and returns were examined for accounts receivable.
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of the extent of audit decisions, while compensation alignment did not matter. Differences
between group F and group D audit decisions were also not significant. Therefore, the results of
tests for H2b are inconclusive overall, and H2b is not supported.
6.6 Practical Significance of Results
The setting for this experiment is the same for all auditor participants—a setting
indicative of high risk for financial statement fraud. The only variation between group conditions
is the form of four risk factors for motivation-for-fraud, and variation between two versions of
management compensation structure. All participant groups agree, based on group mean risk
assessments, that the case is a high fraud risk case. The difference in mean risk rating between
the pressure on top managers condition and other conditions is 1.0 (8.7 versus 7.7) on a 10 scale.
Table 2, Panel A reflects the greatest mean risk assessment (8.7, 95% CI: [8.2, 9.2]) for pressure
of loss on top managers, which is greater than the mean assessment for assessments for
organizationally focused factors (7.7, 95% CI: [6.9, 8.6]). While this risk assessment difference
of 1.0 (on a 1 to 10 scale)36 may seem relatively small to audit practitioners, the associated audit
decision differences represent actionable differences in the extent of audit testing. See Table 6
differences between groups for audit decisions made. Auditors in the pressure-on-managers
condition chose to send six percent more (52 percent versus 46 percent) positive confirmations to
distributors (where fraud risk was seeded) compared to the incentive-to-managers condition. The
difference in percentage of subsequent cash receipts examined for accounts receivable from
distributors, less non-distributors, was greater (2.4 percent versus .7 percent) for auditors in the
pressure on top managers condition, relative to the incentive on top managers condition. The
36

In prior literature similar fraud risk assessment differences (on a 1 to 10 scale) have supported significant findings.
Wilks and Zimbelman support findings base on a decomposed mean risk assessment difference of 2.65 between high
and low risk conditions, compared to a holistic mean risk assessment difference of 1.27 between high and low risk
conditions, a difference in differences of 1.38.
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number of days past year-end to examine subsequent cash receipts was 11% greater (59.1 days
versus 52.9 days), and the number of days past year-end to examine sales returns was 11 %
greater (58.0 days versus 52.2 days) when auditors were exposed to risk factors focused on top
managers, versus on the company.
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The ultimate objective of this study is not to predict what types of risks are assessed
relatively greater than others, but rather, to evaluate the potential for increasing auditor
sensitivity to risks of fraudulent financial reporting. Most fraud risk factor examples for fraud
motivation presented in auditing standards are organizationally focused risks. The process
suggested by the results of this study is for auditors to initially recognize whether motivation-forfraud risk factors observed are focused on the organization or on top managers, then attempt to
refocus organizationally focused risk factors into impacts on top managers, and assess whether
any such impacts represent incentives for personal gains or pressures to avoid personal losses.
Although organizational risk factors can affect top manager decision making, the incentive or
pressure effect of such risks are not always obvious until organizational risk factors are
transformed into risk factors directly impacting top managers. Additional mental processing is
required for auditors to recognize what direct impacts on top managers can result from
organizational risk factors. Engaging auditors in this process of transforming risk factors into
ones closer to pressure on managers will enable them to think more deeply about the true fraud
motivation impact of initially observed organizational fraud risk factors.
In this study, most auditor risk assessments (on a scale from one to 10) ranged from six to
10 for both total fraud risk assessed and for motivation-for-fraud risk assessed. No significant
differences existed between treatment groups for total fraud risk assessed; yet, this study has
highlighted a significant difference for motivation-for-fraud risk assessments when auditors are
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exposed to pressure on top manager risk factors. This result demonstrates that auditors in a
setting where certain risks are assessed as high risk and others are assessed low risk will be made
more sensitive to fraudulent financial reporting risk by processing (refocusing and reframing)
motivation-for-fraud risks as described in the prior paragraph, than they will be by engaging in a
traditional process of assessing total risk based on risk factors separately assessed under each of
the three fraud triangle elements.
7.1 Assessing Fraud Motivation Type
This study is the first to enhance auditor risk assessment and decision-making through the
application of prospect theory to audit risk assessment of management motivation to misreport
earnings. Results support the notion that auditors most often view pressure of a loss as a greater
motivation-for-fraud risk than incentive for a gain, but only when risk factors are focused on
individual managers, not on the organization generally. It is also the first study to employ further
disaggregation37 of one of the three elements of the fraud triangle model to further enhance fraud
risk assessment by differentiating between incentive and pressure for misreporting earnings.
Implications are that auditing standards setters should encourage auditors to attempt to identify
whether a fraud risk factor represents an incentive for gain or pressure of loss on top managers
during the risk assessment process.
7.2 Assessing Fraud Risk Factor Focus
This study also proposes a theoretical explanation for why auditors in prior studies
(Albrecht and Romney 1986; Apostolou 2001; Wilks and Zimbelman 2004) consider certain
fraud risk factors focused on the organization or industry as relatively lower in relevance, and
37

Disaggregation of the three fraud triangle elements was first explored by Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) and again
by Favere-Marchesi (2013).
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factors focused on management as relatively higher in relevance.38 The significant result of the
Focus variable (organizational or individual top manager) for auditor risk assessment in Table 4
reveals that auditors consider fraud risk factors focused on top managers as greater risks than
those focused on the organization generally. Results from this study are consistent with
predictions from application of mental model theory to risk assessment behavior. A mental
model with more logical steps is required for auditors to assess how organizationally focused risk
factors can affect top managers making financial reporting decisions. When auditors attempt to
refocus an organizational level risk factor by considering its impact on top managers, then they
have the opportunity to think more deeply about the risk factor. This process of refocusing the
original risk factor identified could have different outcomes depending on the facts involved. If
an organizational risk factor can be refocused as one impacting top managers, this study finds
that a relatively greater motivation-for-fraud risk assessment is likely to be made, if there is
pressure of loss on the manager. Conversely, if this refocusing process results in a conclusion
that the factor would not have an effect on top managers, then this study indicates that a
relatively lower motivation-for-fraud risk assessment is likely to result, than if there is pressure
on the top manager. For example, in one situation, evaluation of an organizational risk could
reveal a threat to earnings level and stock price impacting CEO and CFO equity incentives, while
in another situation evaluation of the same organizational risk could reveal no impact on CEO
and CFO equity incentives (such as when there is low stock ownership or options held are out of
the money). Therefore, the process of attempting to refocus an organizational risk factor as a risk
to top managers could result in an upward or downward revision in an initial risk assessment,
making the auditor more sensitive to the level of risk indicated by the original risk factor.

38

This is not a direct conclusion of these studies, but rather, observations that can be made from the data presented
in the studies.
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7.3 Limitations and Future Research
There are certain limitations to the applicability of this study. These proposed audit risk
assessment strategies assume that factors motivating individual top managers are always
identifiable and observable, when in fact, many may not be. When Albrecht (1991, 1982, 2014)
adds the term ”perceived” to pressure and opportunity in his fraud scale model, he acknowledges
that motivations for fraud perceived by a manager may not be observable to others. This includes
auditors. Also, the fraud risk factors in this study relate directly to monetary gains or losses to
managers, but changes in manager reputation or other non-monetary rewards are also likely to
motivate top manager behavior. Future research could compare the monetary versus nonmonetary components of fraud motivation. Also, it should be acknowledged that many managers
will not misreport because they exhibit personal integrity and moral convictions that conflict
with misreporting behavior. Additional research could further investigate such personal
characteristics and the circumstances in which they may or may not be influenced by the
motivation-for-fraud risk factors like those considered in this study.
The audit decisions made in this study by auditors for the dependent variables involving
budgeted audit hours varied widely, and results for hypothesized group differences for these
dependent variables were insignificant. Big 4 firm participants planned a greater mean number of
hours for audit tests than did non-Big 4 firm auditors. Differences in decisions of Big 4 versus
non-Big 4 firm audit planning decisions could provide some important insights. More research
could be performed to better understand auditors’ challenges in estimating time budgets for audit
procedures, such as the ones considered in this experiment. Additional research could also
address the time and resources needed by auditors to implement the motivation-for-fraud risk
assessment process suggested by the results of this study.
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This study was conducted in a high fraud risk setting for all participant conditions, which
likely had the effect of restraining the range of auditee risk assessment responses. Future
research could test auditor response to the fraud risk factor refocusing and reframing strategy in
both a low fraud risk and high fraud risk setting, in order to evaluate the impact of the strategy on
auditor efficiency and effectiveness over a range of risk settings.
In this study, many auditors tended to average their three risk assessments under each of
the three elements of the fraud triangle categories for organizing fraud risk factors. Research
could seek to better understand how auditors combine risk assessments, and whether certain
approaches to combining risk assessments change the sensitivity of risk evaluation.
The tests of auditor decisions reflected in Table 6 included tests of multiple dependent
variables. While steps have been taken to limit Type I error risk, it is always possible that some
auditor decision findings result by chance across these multiple tests. Additional research in
auditor decision making in response to incentive and pressure risk assessments could further
clarify the specific findings regarding audit procedure decisions.
7.4 Conclusion
Pincus (1989) observed that a red flag checklist used in a fraud case can be more harmful
than productive, indicating that a checklist of fraud risk factors can limit thinking, rather than
prompt critical thinking by auditors. Hammersley (2011) finds that the diagnosticity of fraud risk
factors and the degree to which they support generation of specific testable fraud hypotheses
affects auditors’ ability to plan effective changes to audit programs. The results of this current
study support a continued evolution in auditing risk assessment approaches, moving away from
the checklist mentality observed by Pincus (1989), toward a process of deeper thinking described
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by Hammersely (2011). Results of this study suggest that auditors can increase their sensitivity
to fraud risks by engaging in a process of refocusing organizational factors, including executive
compensation plans, into factors relating to top managers, and assessing whether those risks are
incentives or pressures on top managers. Sensitivity to fraud risks is important because it should
lead auditors to assess relatively more evidence when risk is high and relatively less evidence
when risk is low. This approach balances the desire for effectiveness and efficiency in auditing.
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Appendix
Examples of Fraud Risk Factors
A.1 This appendix contains examples of risk factors discussed in paragraphs 65 through 69 of Auditing
Standard No. 12, Identifying and Assessing Risks of Material Misstatement. Separately presented are
examples relating to the two types of fraud relevant to the auditor's consideration—that is, fraudulent financial
reporting and misappropriation of assets. For each of these types of fraud, the risk factors are further classified
based on the three conditions generally present when material misstatements due to fraud occur: (a)
incentives/pressures, (b) opportunities, and (c) attitudes/rationalizations. Although the risk factors cover a broad
range of situations, they are only examples and, accordingly, the auditor may wish to consider additional or
different risk factors. Not all of these examples are relevant in all circumstances, and some may be of greater
or lesser significance in entities of different size or with different ownership characteristics or circumstances.
Also, the order of the examples of risk factors provided is not intended to reflect their relative importance or
frequency of occurrence.
Risk Factors Relating to Misstatements Arising From Fraudulent Financial Reporting
A.2 The following are examples of risk factors relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial
reporting.
Incentives/Pressures

a.

Financial stability or profitability is threatened by economic, industry, or entity operating conditions, such as
(or as indicated by):

o

High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins

o

High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product obsolescence, or interest
rates

o

Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the industry or overall
economy

o

Operating losses making the threat of bankruptcy, foreclosure, or hostile takeover imminent

o

Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate cash flows from operations
while reporting earnings and earnings growth

o

Rapid growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other companies in the same
industry

o

New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements
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b.

Excessive pressure exists for management to meet the requirements or expectations of third parties due to
the following:

o

Profitability or trend level expectations of investment analysts, institutional investors, significant
creditors, or other external parties (particularly expectations that are unduly aggressive or unrealistic),
including expectations created by management in, for example, overly optimistic press releases or
annual report messages

o

Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive—including financing of major
research and development or capital expenditures

o

Marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or debt repayment or other debt covenant
requirements

o

Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on significant pending transactions,
such as business combinations or contract awards

c.

Information available indicates that management or the board of directors' personal financial situation is
threatened by the entity's financial performance arising from the following:

o

Significant financial interests in the entity

o

Significant portions of their compensation (for example, bonuses, stock options, and earn-out
arrangements) being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for stock price, operating results,
financial position, or cash flow

o
d.

Personal guarantees of debts of the entity

There is excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet financial targets set up by the
board of directors or management, including sales or profitability incentive goals.

Opportunities
a.

The nature of the industry or the entity's operations provides opportunities to engage in fraudulent financial
reporting that can arise from the following:

o

Related party transactions that are also significant unusual transactions (e.g., a significant related party
transaction outside the normal course of business)

o

Significant transactions with related parties whose financial statements are not audited or are audited by
another firm

o

A strong financial presence or ability to dominate a certain industry sector that allows the entity to dictate
terms or conditions to suppliers or customers that may result in inappropriate or non-arm's-length
transactions
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o

Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve subjective
judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate

o

Significant or highly complex transactions or significant unusual transactions, especially those close to
period end, that pose difficult "substance-over-form" questions

o

Significant operations located or conducted across international borders in jurisdictions where differing
business environments and cultures exist

o

Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in tax-haven jurisdictions for which there
appears to be no clear business justification

o
b.

Contractual arrangements lacking a business purpose

There is ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:

o

Domination of management by a single person or small group (in a nonowner-managed business)
without compensating controls

o

Ineffective board of directors or audit committee oversight over the financial reporting process and
internal control

o
c.

d.

The exertion of dominant influence by or over a related party

There is a complex or unstable organizational structure, as evidenced by the following:

o

Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling interest in the entity

o

Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial lines of authority

o

High turnover of senior management, counsel, or board members

Internal control components are deficient as a result of the following:

o

Inadequate monitoring of controls, including automated controls and controls over interim financial
reporting (where external reporting is required)

o

High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit, or information technology
staff

o

Ineffective accounting and information systems, including situations involving reportable conditions

Attitudes/Rationalizations
Risk factors reflective of attitudes/rationalizations by board members, management, or employees, that allow
them to engage in and/or justify fraudulent financial reporting, may not be susceptible to observation by the
auditor. Nevertheless, the auditor who becomes aware of the existence of such information should consider it
in identifying the risks of material misstatement arising from fraudulent financial reporting. For example,
auditors may become aware of the following information that may indicate a risk factor:
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o

Ineffective communication, implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity's values or
ethical standards by management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical
standards

o

Nonfinancial management's excessive participation in or preoccupation with the selection of
accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates

o

Known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and regulations, or claims against
the entity, its senior management, or board members alleging fraud or violations of laws and
regulations

o

Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity's stock price or
earnings trend

o

A practice by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third parties to
achieve aggressive or unrealistic forecasts

o

Management failing to correct known reportable conditions on a timely basis

o

An interest by management in employing inappropriate means to minimize reported earnings
for tax-motivated reasons

o

Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting on the
basis of materiality

o

The relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor is strained, as
exhibited by the following:



Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or
reporting matters



Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as unreasonable time constraints
regarding the completion of the audit or the issuance of the auditor's report



Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappropriately limit access to
people or information or the ability to communicate effectively with the board of
directors or audit committee



Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially involving
attempts to influence the scope of the auditor's work or the selection or continuance
of personnel assigned to or consulted on the audit engagement
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93

94

Behavioral
Research in
Accounting

Apostolou et al. 2001

Johnstone and Bedard The
2001
Accounting
Review
Bedard and Graham Auditing: A
2002
Journal of
Practice &
Theory

Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice &
Theory

Wright and Bedard
2000

Journal of
Accounting
Rezearch

Zimbelman 1997

An experiment with 137 mid-level
auditors at a large CPA firm.

Context
Survey of 20 audit firms, asking
them to respond about 10 fraud
engagements and 10 no-fraud
engagements.

Engagement Planning, Bid Pricing,
and Client Response in the Market
for Initial Attestation Engagements
The Effects of Decision Aid
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Relationship with this Current Dissertation
Thus current study demonstrates that
differences in auditor reaction to otherwise
similar fraud risk factors can be explained by
the focus and framing of the fraud risk factor.

Fraud risk factors listed in current auditing
standards present factors listed as examples of
fraud risks, not an all inclusive list. This current
study demonstrates that auditor reaction to
modifications of these example fraud risk
factors can be explained by their focus and
framing.
The SAS No. 82 list of fraud risk factors increased
Most SAS No. 82 fraud risk factor examples
attention to fraud cues but not sensitive to low versus
were carried forward to the superseding SAS
high fraud cases. Extent of testing increase in both low No. 99 auditing standard. This current study
and high fraud cases, and the nature of testing was not seeks to identify differences in audit planning
different in high versus low fraud cases.
decisions that result from differences in the
focus and framing of these fraud risk factors.
Recognition of risk factors may help less experienced
This current study compares differences in the
auditors improve performance in planning. However,
extent of testing between groups exposed to the
risk factors identified were not associated with changes same motivation-for-fraud risk factors which
in the extent of testing.
are focused and framed differently from one
another.
Auditors rate relative importance of fraud risk factors
The current study relies on mental model theory
from SAS No. 82. This descriptive evidence is mixed
to motivate hypotheses that compare the similar
with respect to motivation for fraud factors focused on fraud risks with a different focus (top managers
top managers (two with low relative importance and one or the organization). The results demonstrate
with high relative importance); and is consistent about
that auditor risk assessments are influenced by
fraud risk factors focused on the organization and
whether a risk factor is focused on the
industry (low relative importance). This study does not organization or on top managers.
attempt to understand why auditors consider some fraud
risk factors more important than others.
Fraud risk factors did not change planned audit
personnel hours, but did result in more use of specialists,
and more testing and review.
Auditors using a decision aid with a negative orientation The question about whether motivation
find more fraud risks than those using a decision aid
comprised of pressure for fraud is equivalent to
with a positive orientation.
a negative orientation and whether motivation
comprised of incentive for fraud is equivalent to
positive orientation remains unknown, and could
be the subject of future research.

When fraud was present, participants with a checklist of
fraud risk factors underperformed participants without a
checklist. A fraud risk factor checklist did increased the
comprehensiveness and uniformity of seniors' data
acquisition, but it appeared to limit the fraud
consideration set.

Conclusions
Only 31 of 87 fraud risk factors tested were said to be
significant to fraud risk assessment. This descriptive
study does not seek to understand why certain fraud ris
factors were considered more important than others.
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80 partners in each of the three
participating firms.

Title
Context
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Glover et al. 2003 is an experiment
with 91 auditors with an average of
4.8 years of experience.

Auditor fraud knowledge will significantly affect auditor
performance in audit program modification tasks through
its effect on fraud risk factor identification and
hypothesis generation. The diagnosticity of fraud risk
factors affect auditors' ability to plan effective changes
to audit programs.
Auditors that quantify a separate fraud risk assessment
for each of the fraud triangle categories are more
sensitive to fraud risks than are auditors who only
categorize fraud cues into the three fraud triangle
categories, and then quantify an overall fraud risk
assessment.

Both, strategic reasoning and brainstorming lead to more
effective modifications to standard audit procedures.
Both strategic reasoning and brainstorming together do
not lead to a greater effectiveness than either one alone.

This study contradicts the results of most prior research
up to this point. Participants self-reported that the
nature, extent, and staffing used was responsive to the
number and type of documented fraud risks.

Conclusions
Post-SAS No. 82 planning judgments are more sensitive
to fraud risk factors than during the pre-SAS No.82
period. However, there is a tenuous link between risk
assessments and planning decisions. Extent of testing is
increased for higher fraud risks, but not the nature of
testing.
Asare and Wright
Contemporary The Effectiveness of Alternative Risk An experiment with 74 participants Fraud risk factors were identified, but were not
2004
Accounting
Assessment and Program Planning
from three Big 5 firms.
associated with more effective fraud procedures (other
Research
Tools in a Fraud Setting
Participants had an average of 9.7 than increased consultation with specialists).
years experience.
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An experiment with 95 audit
Auditors who decompose fraud-risk assessments into
2004
Accounting
Assessments and Auditors' Sensitivity managers from two of the Big 5
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Research
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firms.
opportunity and incentive/pressure fraud risk factors
than those who do not, but only when they are in the low
fraud risk condition.

Author(s) and Year
Journal
Glover et al. 2003
Auditing: A
Journal of
Practice &
Theory

Auditor Fraud Risk Assessment Literature

This current study also presents fraud risk
factors to participants in three fraud triangle
categories. However, this current study is
exclusively focused on the effect of focus and
framing of motivation-for-fraud risks, called
incentive/pressure fraud risk factors in current
auditing standards.

The same variables for auditor panning
decisions used by Hoffman and Zimbelman
(2009) are also employed in the current study to
measure auditor decision-making.

This current study also presents fraud risk
factors to participants in three fraud triangle
categories. However, this current study is
exclusively focused on the effect of focus and
framing of motivation-for-fraud risks, called
incentive/pressure fraud risk factors in current
auditing standards.

Relationship with this Current Proposal
The Hoffman and Zimbelman (2009) tests of
auditor planning decisions are adopted in this
current study in order to consider both the
nature and extent of tests prompted by the fraud
case.
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Welcome!
Thank you for your participation in this study. Your responses will be used for academic
research purposes. Your reactions to a company case are requested in an effort to gain
knowledge that could enhance auditing practice. Your responses to this study will be aggregated
with those of other participants and will not be tracked with your identity or the identity of your
firm. Only auditing Seniors, Managers, Senior Managers or comparable higher ranking positions
are qualified to participate in this study. Please respond to questions using an ink pen. Once
you have committed to an answer, please do not take the time to change it at a later time.
Instructions
Assume that you are an experienced audit professional on the team auditing the annual financial
statements of U.S. Instrumentation Corporation (“USI” or “the Company”) for the year ended
December 31, 2014. As an audit team member newly assigned to lead this engagement, you will
be reviewing fraud risk factors evaluated by the audit team during initial audit planning, and will
also be making some audit planning decisions regarding sales and accounts receivable.
General Company Information
U.S. Instrumentation Corporation is a publicly held manufacturer of analog and digital
instrumentation gauges used in a wide variety of equipment applications. USI’s stock is traded
on the NASDAQ. Its product markets are competitive. The product technology demanded by
end-user customers has been gradually moving away from analog toward digital technology.
Analog

Digital with Analog Appearance

Digital

The company has steadily grown, as shown by its increasing sales from $15.8 million in 1999 to
nearly $300 million in 2014.
Sales and Receivables
Historically, sales have been made through two channels with some accounts handled directly by
the company and the remaining sales made through licensed distributors. Both the sales handled
directly by USI and those to licensed distributors are recorded when shipped, which is consistent
with the Company's policy of shipping FOB shipping point. Accounts are written off only after
extensive collection efforts are taken. The allowance for doubtful accounts is based on an
analysis of accounts outstanding as determined necessary by management.
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Specific Audit Information
PART I
Risk Assessment Instructions
Independent of the proceeding General Company Information, your audit team has identified 4
different opportunity-for-fraud risk factors during earlier interim inquiries of management.
Because you are a more experienced member of the audit team, you are now rating the level of
fraud risk posed by each fraud risk factor.
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Instructions: Opportunity to Commit Fraud Risk Factors
The following work paper lists fraud risk factors based on opportunity to commit financial
statement fraud, as could be identified by your audit engagement team. Rate the level of fraud
risk represented by each factor on a scale from low risk to high risk by darkening the circle
that represents your best judgment.
Opportunity for Fraud Risk Assessment Documentation
Performed by:WCD
Date:_11/3/14___

Fraud Risk Factors Identified By Engagement Team:
USI has assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve subjective
judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate.

USI has significant related party transactions not in the ordinary course of business and with related
entities not audited or audited by another firm.

USI has significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year-end that pose
difficult "substance over form" questions.

USI has bank accounts and branch warehouse facilities in foreign jurisdictions for which there appears to
be no clear business justification.

What is your overall Opportunity fraud risk assessment for financial statement fraud for
this client on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 10 (high risk)? ____________
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Instructions: Attitude/Rationalization about Committing Fraud
Your audit team has also searched for attitude/rationalization-for-fraud risk factors for financial
statement fraud, but has found none. Over the last 8 years, the management team has been very
easy to work with and has shown a high level of competence. The company complies with all of
the corporate governance requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley. Consider this work paper and make a
fraud risk assessment below on a scale from low risk to high risk, according to your best
judgment.
Attitude/Rationalization for Fraud Risk Assessment Documentation
Performed by:WCD
Date:_11/3/14___
Fraud Risk Factors Identified By Engagement Team:
Twelve attitude/rationalization fraud risk factor examples from auditing standards were evaluated and
these risks were determined to not be present at this client.

Instruction: What is your overall Attitude/Rationalization fraud risk assessment for this
client on a scale from 1(low) to 10 (high)? ____________
Management Compensation
Total top management compensation in this public company is within the range also typically
paid by its closest peer-group companies. The executive compensation plan at USI is designed to
retain qualified top executives. Top management compensation is 70% fixed salary, and 30%
variable bonus, stock grants and options grants. The top management team has total
ownership in USI stock and options valued at less than one times annual compensation. The
top five managers combined do not own a controlling interest in the Company. Following is a
schedule of current year compensation and the ownership in company stock and stock options
held by the top five executives.
Current Yr Compensation (Based on Unaudited Financials)
Value of Stock
Total
and Options
Annual
Value of Equity Owned in Company
Top 5 Execs.
Salary
Bonus
Granted
Compensation
Stock Options
Stock
CEO
$ 1,020,000 $ 380,000 $ 190,000 $ 1,590,000
$
910,000 $
1,610,000
CFO
510,000
139,182
45,600
694,782
198,400
386,400
Three VPs
938,400
260,618
32,300
1,231,318
134,700
273,700
2,468,400
779,800
267,900 $ 3,516,100
1,243,100
2,270,100

70%
Fixed Wage

30%
Variable Wage

100%
Total

100

Less than 1 times annual total pay:
Variable wealth as a multiple of
total annual compensation

Instructions: Motivation to Commit Fraud Risk Factors

As before, read and consider each fraud risk factor that follows for motivation to commit
financial statement fraud, as identified by your engagement team. Rate the level of fraud risk
represented by each factor on a scale from low risk to high risk by darkening the circle
that represents your best judgment.
Motivation for Fraud Risk Assessment Documentation

Performed by:WCD
Date:_11/3/14___

Fraud Risk Factors Identified By Engagement Team:
A high degree of competition and market saturation has led to declining margins in the industry, and top management
believes that its own total compensation will decrease by 15% this year if a new marketing strategy is not successfully
implemented.

Maintaining an adequate interest coverage ratio (EBITDA/interest expense) has been difficult, and failure to achieve a
ratio of 1.5 times for 2014 will result in the establishment of a personal loan guarantee by the USI CEO on the debt of
USI, which guarantee is equal in size to 25% of the total personal net worth of the CEO.

During the first three quarters, USI had a marginal ability to meet financial statement debt covenant requirements,
which if not met within the 4th quarter will lead it to refinance debt at a higher interest rate. The CFO expects the
higher interest rate will result in a 12% decrease in annual total compensation of its top five executives.

There are management-favorable 3 year employment contracts in place for the CEO and CFO. These employment
contracts will be voided and replaced with at-will employment agreements if USI cannot meet a $285 million sales
target for this year.

What is your overall Motivation for fraud risk assessment for financial statement fraud for
this client on a scale from 1 (low risk to 10 (high risk)? ____________
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RECAP
Look back to pages 3, 4, and 5 to review your overall risk rating for opportunity,
attitude/rationalization, and motivation fraud risk factors. At this time, what is your overall
financial statement fraud risk assessment for this client on a scale from 1 (low risk) to 10 (high
risk)? ____________

PART II
New Marketing Plan
To implement a new marketing plan, distributors were given sales responsibility for all of USI’s
analog product accounts, which were approximately half of the smaller customers previously
serviced by USI, while USI continued to service the larger, digital product accounts directly.
Also, distributors were given significant incentives to buy analog products starting in midNovember and December. These incentives included profit sharing opportunities, favorable
financing terms, and provision of warehousing and storage incentives.

Analytical Procedures
The table below presents year-end data and analytical procedures performed with year-end and
11-month unaudited internal financial statements. The analytical procedures were initially
performed in early December using unaudited data from the November 30, 2014 and were
updated in January using unaudited December 31, 2014 balances, as provided by management.

Key Financial Statement Data:
Net Sales
Net Income
Accounts Receivable (AR)
Allowance for doubtful (DA)
accounts plus for sales returns
Total assets

(Audited)
12/31/2010
$ 208,568
2,239
27,760
3,028
207,012

Annual Amounts and Balances in Thousands (000)
11 months
(Audited) (Audited) (Audited) (unaudited)
12/31/2011 12/31/2012 12/31/2013 11/30/2014
$ 248,972 $ 275,797 $ 270,660 $
269,497
3,361
4,977
5,411
4,084
34,493
34,895
38,055
47,057
4,071
231,570

3,873
255,614

4,684
260,455

Selected Ratios:
Days sales in Accounts Recivable
Allowance for DA as % of AR
Interest Coverage Ratio

5,000
265,734

12 months
(unaudited)
12/31/2014
$ 293,997
5,450
52,208
5,440
270,896

(annualized)
48.6
10.9%
1.5

50.6
11.8%
1.3

46.2
11.1%
1.5

51.3
12.3%
1.4

(A) 54.4
11.7%
1.2

(B) 64.8
10.4%
1.5

See notes (A) and (B), following:
(A) Management explained that USI instituted a new marketing strategy in mid-November that led to the increase
in this ratio. Responsibility for all sales of analog products was turned over to the distributors, while USI focused
its marketing efforts on its digital products.
(B) Management believes the new marketing initiative, described in note (A) above, will be very successful, as
many distributors placed orders of analog products in the second half of November and December. Management
explained that, by year-end, over 90% of the distributors had signed up for the program and placed orders for
analog products.
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Audit Plan-Accounts Receivable

Instruction:
Your engagement partner on this client has asked you to challenge the number of confirmations
sent and other audit decisions made last year, and to independently plan new decisions this year
base on your risk assessments and other facts you have read in this case. You may use any
decision you deem necessary, while striving to maintain both effectiveness and efficiency.
How many of each of the following customer accounts receivable confirmations would you plan
for this current year audit?
Number of
Accounts to
Confirm
12/31/2014
Number of positive confirmations to USI serviced customers: (Last year 35 accounts, with $4,855,000 coverage) _______
Number of positive confirmations to distributors: (Last year 30 accounts, with $995,000 coverage)

_______

Number of negative confirmations to USI serviced customers: (Last year 100 accounts,
with $3,242,000 coverage)

_______

Number of negative confirmations to distributors: (Last year 100 accounts, with $3,310,000 coverage)

_______

How many days past year-end would you plan for the following audit decisions for this current
year audit?
Days
Number of days past year-end to examine subsequent receipts for accounts receivable collections:
(45 days used last year)

_______

Number of days past year-end to examine sales returns: (45 days last year)

_______
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What percentage coverage would you plan for the following audit decisions for this current year
audit?
The % of subsequent cash receipts to examine for collection of USI-serviced accounts receivable for which
no confirmations were sent: (10% last year)

_______

The % of subsequent cash receipts to examine for collection of distributor accounts receivable for which
no confirmations were sent: (10% last year)

_______

How many hours, if any, would you plan for the following audit decisions for this current year
audit?
Hours
Number of hours of computer assisted audit techniques or computer forensics procedures: (Zero used last year) _______
Number of hours for interviews of client personnel regarding sales and accounts receivable: (Zero used last year) _______
Total hours for all sales and accounts receivable procedures: (96 hours last year)*

_______

* Total audit program hours in the line above include all procedures specified above, plus all other sales
and accounts receivable procedures not specified above, such as: analytical procedures, bad debt and
receivable aging analysis, cut-off testing, and reconciliation of detail ledgers to summary ledgers.

CONCLUSION
Final 10 Questions
Please circle the best answer for each question below. Do not take the time to look
backwards into the case to answer any question.
1. How many total years of experience do you have in public accounting, rounded to the nearest
year?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2. Which of the following best describes your employer?
a) a Big 4 public accounting firm
b) a large or medium sized public accounting firm, other than Big 4
c) a single office or multiple office small public accounting firm
d) other
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9

10 or more

3. Which of the following best describes your position level in your firm?
a) Staff
b) Senior
c) Manager
c) Senior Manager
d) Director
e) Partner or Principal

4. Which of the following two lists best summarizes top management compensation structure in
this case?
List a)

List b)

List a:

List b:

30% fixed salary
70% bonus/options/stock grants
Executive stock and option ownership value
exceeding more than 13 times annual
compensation

70% fixed salary
30% bonus/options/stock grants
Executive stock and option ownership value
less than annual compensation

5. For this question, ignore top management compensation structure, and think only about the
Motivation-for fraud risk factors you rated in the case. Which one of the following two lists
best summarizes the potential outcome focus described in the Motivation-for-fraud risk factors
rated by you in this case?
a) Outcomes for the Company:

or

b) Outcomes for top executives:

a) Outcomes for the Company:

b) Outcomes for top executives:

A change in Company earnings
A change in terms for a Company technology
license agreement
A change regarding a Company loan guarantee
on debt of the Company Employee Stock
Ownership Plan

A change in top executive compensation
A change in terms for the CEO and CFO
employment agreements
A change regarding a CEO personal loan
guarantee on debt of the Company
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6. For this question, ignore top management compensation structure, and think only about the
Motivation-for fraud risk factors you rated in the case. Which one of the following two lists best
summarizes the potential outcomes described in the Motivation-for-fraud risk factors rated by you in
this case?

a) Penalties if targets were not achieved:

or

b) Rewards if targets were achieved:

a) Penalties if targets were not achieved:

b) Rewards if targets were achieved:

A decline in income
Deterioration in terms for a contract or
agreement from 3 year terms to monthly or atwill terms
Establishment of a loan guarantee

An increase in income
Improvement in terms for a contract or
agreement from monthly or at-will terms to 3
year terms
A release from a loan guarantee

7. Does your employer conduct audits of public companies?
a) Yes

b) Unsure

c) No

8. How many audit engagements have you worked on within a public company setting during the
past year?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 or more

9. In how many professional engagements during your career, if any, would you estimate you
have you taken steps or caused steps to be taken to evaluate suspected intentional misstatements
affecting company earnings, which may have been material? ____

10. If there any final comments you would like to make to the researcher, please write below:

This concludes the study. Thank you for your participation.

106

APPENDIX D
IRB APPROVAL LETTER

107

May 1, 2014
Donald Wengler
School of Accountancy
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